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THE CORPORATE REORGANIZATION PROVISION IN SENATE
BILL 3866
A PROPOSED DRAFT OF A NEW BANKRUPTCY ACT*
STUDENTS of the subject of corporate reorganization have for some years
employed much diligence and ingenuity in efforts to devise a satisfactory
solution to the evils and uncertainties encountered in reorganizing large
*This comment deals only with the corporate reorganization provision of
Senate Bill 3866. Senate Bill 4921, more recently introduced, propose3 the
addition of a corporate reorganization provision to the present Banluptcy
Act. Contrary to Section 76 of Bill 3866, this latter proposal is made applicable
to railroads as well as to industrial corporations. The provisions of the two
proposals in regard to the problems herein discussed are substantially similar.




corporations.' The most pressing problems have been to devise machinery
(1) to obtain an adjudication upon the fairness of the reorganization
plan in advance of the consummation of the reorganization, and to protect
a fair plan from a later attack such as was permitted in the Boyd case; 2
and (2) to compel a minority to accept an honest and advantageous plan
approved by the majority.3
With the help and co6peration of the federal equity courts, fairly suc-
cessful practical devices have been developed to meet the first need. Briefly
this machinery consists in supplementing the conventional decree of sale
with a provision that a sale to any reorganization committee will not be
confirmed unless a fair and timely offer of participation in the plan has
been made to all entitled thereto, with reservation by the court of exclusive
jurisdiction to determine whether or not the plan contained such a fair
1. For a summary of the usual procedure to reorganization by way of the
consent receivership in the federal equity court and of the attendant evils and
problems, see Rosenberg, A New Scheme of Reorganization (191) 17 COL.
L. Rv. 523.
2. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913). Discussions and
analyses of the Boyd case are legion. See Cravath, Reorganization of Cor.
porations in SOME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND
REGULATION (1917) 153, 191; Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain
Developments of the Last Decade (1927) 27 CO. L. REv. 901; Cutcheon, Devioes
Employed to Obviate the Embarrassments Created by the Boyd Case, 8 Lic-
TURES ON LEGAL Topics (1931) 35.
3. The traditional legal conception of a mortgage bondholder is that he
is a sort of tenant in common of the security with other bondholders so that
unanimous consent is necessary to effect a change in the lien. Strict adherence
to this doctrine has made resort to foreclosure the only means of removing a
lien. The fact that dissenting bondholders under this procedure are entitled
to their pro rata share in cash of the price obtained at the foreclosure sale
has been the source of some of the gravest problems of reorganization. See
Weiner, Conflicting Functions of the Upset Price in a Corporate Reorganiza-
tion (1927) 27 CoL. L. Ru-. 132; Spring, Upset Price in Corporate Reorganiza-
tion (1919) 32 HAIv. L. REv. 489.
Cf. cases where the mortgage indenture contains a provision permitting a
majority of the bondholders to cause the mortgaged property to be purchased
for their benefit and reorganized as the majority may determine; or a pro-
vision incorporated by reference in the securities, prohibiting suits to enforce
the obligation except by action of a named percentage of security holders.
Sage v. Central Rr., 99 U. S. 334 (1878); Crosthwaite v. Moline Plow Co., 298
Fed. 466 (S. D. N. Y. 1924); Allan v. Moline Plow Co., 14 F. (2d) 912 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1926); (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 579, 582. These provisions are rare in
this country, however, since it is believed that there are serious questions about
the negotiability of securities affected by them. Swaine, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 927; Steffen & Russell, The Negotiability of Corporate Bonds (1932) 41
YALE L. J. 799, 810.
In regard to the problems involved in providing for dissenting minority un-
secured creditors, see Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, supra note 2; Coriel v.
White, 54 F. (2d) 255 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931), commented upon in 41 YIn L. 1.
577 (1932); 45 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1932).
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offer; 4 and providing for notice to be given, by extensive publication, of
the provisions of the decree and the filing of any reorganization plan,
and ordering in the decree that all claims not filed within the time limit
set by the court should be barred from participation in any way in any
of the property of the defendant corporation. This order is made effective
by enjoining any subsequent suits against the corporation.5 While some
doubts have been cast upon the validity of these devices, their use has
been so generally recognized that the question of their validity seems
largely academic today.0
On the contrary, an effective method of compelling a dissenting minority
to participate in an honest and advantageous plan approved by the ma-
jority is still lacking.7 Judge Sanborn, in the Pkipps case 8 ventured
4. North American Co. v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. (E. D. Mo. March
31, 1916) [unreported, see St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. McElvain, 253 Fed.
123, 126 (E. D. Mo. 1918); Swaine, op. cit. supra note 2, at 908]; Guaranty
Trust Co. v. Missouri Pacific Ry. (E. D. Mo. Dec. 21, 1916) [unreported, see
Walsh Tie & Timber Co. v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 280 Fed. 38, 41 (C. C. A. 8th,
1922); Swaine, ibid.]; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. (N. D.
Ill. April 26, 1926) [unreported, see Guaranty Trust Co. v. Chicago, M. & St.
P. Ry., 15 F. (2d) 434, 437 (N. D. Ill. 1926); Swaine, ibid.].
The determination df the fairness of the plan is generally made upon the
application for confirmation of the sale. See list of cases in Swaine, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 910. The practice used in some few cases of determining the
question in advance of the decree or of the sale [see Habirshaw Electric Cable
Co. v. Habirshaw Electric Cable Co., 296 Fed. 875 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924)] has not
gained general recognition because it is thought that the question of fairness
is not moot at this early stage of the proceedings and hence can have no bind-
ing force. See Swaine, ibid.
5. This decree has been held binding both upon creditors who have not filed
their claims, St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Wall (E. D. Mo. 1918) [unre-
ported, see Swaine, op. cit. supra note 2, at 909, n. 28); Chicago, R. L & P.
Ry. v. Lincoln Horse & M. Com'n Co., 284 Fed. 955 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922) as
well as upon creditors who had filed their claims, St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.
v. McElwain, 253 Fed. 123 (E. D. Mo. 1918)].
6. The efficacy of these devices has never been submitted to a test before
the United States Supreme Court. For a painstaking, critical analysis see
Cutcheon, op. cit. supra note 2. Cf. Harding v. American Sumatra Tobacco
Co., 14 F. (2d) 168, 169 (N. D. Ga. 1926).
7. The sale with the fidng of an upset price has come to be used as a tool
to force recalcitrants into the plan. For a thorough account and analysis of
the injustice and evil by-products of the upset price and of its inadequacy
to meet the problem of "nuisance strikers" or unreasonable dissenters, see
Weiner, op. cit. supra note 3. See also Rosenberg, op. cit. supra note 1, at
528; Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations (2d ed. 1926) 963; Cravath,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 202; Walker, Rcorganization by Decrec: Recent Note-
worthy Instances (1920) 6 CoRN. L. Q. 154.
8. Phipps v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 284 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922)
where unsecured creditors were compelled to take stock in payment of their
claims, other action on their part being enjoined, and the property was turned
back to the old corporation without the formality of a sale. The procedure
in this case has been well described as a "solution which, if sound, may re3ult
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daringly to extend the federal-equity-court-made law on reorganization to
solve this most urgent problem. However, his decision that minority
creditors might be compelled to accept the securities allotted to them
under the plan has been so clouded with doubts by both courts and writers
that it has proven, thus far, of little aid in meeting the problem. The
belief is still generally adhered to that dissenting creditors, secured or
unsecured, must be offered some cash alternative to participation in the
plan.9
If this means that dissenting creditors must be paid in full before
stockholders can be allowed any interest in the reorganized company, the
expense may often be prohibitive of reorganization, particularly where
an industrial corporation is concerned.' 0 If creditors need not be paid
in full, but must be paid their pro rata share of the value of the corporate
assets, all of the intricate and troublesome questions of valuation must
be faced. Past experience leads to the conclusion that it is well-nigh
impossible to solve the problem of dissenters satisfactorily in this fashion.
Either creditors are granted so tempting a cash alternative 11 that the
success of the reorganization is endangered, or, as is most often the case,
the offer is too insignificant to be called an alternative at all. 12
in the 'scrapping' of most of the learning and ingenuity that have been ex-
pended upon the development of reorganizations and suits to facilitate them."
Cutcheon, op. cit. supra note 2, at 64.
9. Mr. James N. Rosenberg had contended prior to the Phipps decision that
the federal courts had the powers there exercised. See Rosenberg, Reorganiza-
tion-The Next Step (1922) 22 CoL. L. REV. 14. For his enthusiastic endorsement
subsequently of the Phipps case and its implications, see Rosenberg, Phippo v.
Chicago Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. (1924) 24 COL. L. Ruv. 266. But see
Swaine, Reorganization-The Next Step: A Reply to Mr. James N. Rosenberg
(1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 121; Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Develop-
ments of the Last Decade (1927) 27 CoL. L. Ray. 901, 924; Cutcheon, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 69. See in particular the recent case of Coriel v. White, supra
note 3, where the necessity of a cash alternative to creditors was emphasized,
although the procedure of the Phipps case was followed to the extent of dis-
pensing with a public sale. See also the American Sumatra Tobacco Co. case,
supra note 6.
10. Dissenting creditors in an Industrial reorganization are in a particularly
strategic position to demand full payment under the present system, because
they may threaten to force liquidation. Aggravating this difficulty is the fact
that stockholders of embarrassed industrials can seldom be induced to make
a direct sacrifice, such as the payment of an assessment. Dewing, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 1110.
11. The provision in Coriel v. White, supra note 3, that the creditor might
elect the cash value of the securities allotted to him under the plan is of this
too tempting nature. See Comment (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 577, 582; Comment
(1932) 45 HARv. L. RFv. 697, 699 n. 7.
12. The cash offer is generally of this fictitious character when an upset
price is fixed. See Weiner, op. cit. supra note 3. The provision in the Coriel
case for valuation of the creditor's claim on the basis of the appraised sum
which the assets of the company would bring if sold at a public sale, is of this
prohibitive nature, "since a sale if ordered, would in all probability not have
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The thought suggests itself that it might be well to face the apparent
fact that a fair and equitable reorganization plan can be put into operation
successfully only by compelling a minority to accept a plan approved by
the majority. It is submitted that direct and open recognition of this
fact will make unnecessary the unmerited time and attention centered
upon the illusion of a cash alternative, and focus attention on the really
salient issue-attainment of a sound, fair plan.l 3
Section 76 of the Proposed Draft of a New Bankruptcy Act, now before
the Judiciary Committee, is the first attempt to meet thes6d problems
through federal legislation. 14 The theory is that Congress, under its
produced more than the upset price fixed by the court." (1932) 45 HARv. L. Ruv.
at 1397. See also id. at 702.
13. This pretense of offering creditors a cash alternative was responsible
for the apparent attitude of the court in the Coriel case that the consideration
of the fairness of the plan was unimportant. See (1932) 41 Y,=x L. 3. 577,
578.
14. In England, corporate reorganizations have long been regulated by
statutes binding minority creditors to a compromise or arrangement con-
sented to by creditors holding three-fourths in value of the total claims
and sanctioned by the court. Railway Companies Act 1867, 30 & 31 Vict.
c. 127; 8. Edw. VII, c. 69, § 120 (1908) substantially reenacting Joint
Stock Companies Arrangement Act, 33 & 34 Vict. c. 104 (1870). The validity
of the statute has been upheld and it has been interpreted to apply to the
removal or change of the liens of debenture holders. Slater v. Darlaston Steel
& Iron Co., [1877] W. N. 139; In re Empire Mining Co., 44 Ch. Div. 402 (1890);
Re Alabama, New Orleans & Pac. Junction Ry. Co., [1891J 1 Ch. (C. A.) 213.
Apparently unsecured creditors may be compelled to accept stock under this
legislation. See Slater v. Darlaston Steel & Iron Co., id. at 165. The same
procedure is available in Canada by special Act passed for each reorganization.
See Canada So. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527 (1883). A general provision
of this nature may be found in the Dominion Winding-up Act. CANADA REV.
STAT. (1906) c. 144, §§ 63, 64; but this Act does not seem to be used
very much because it is often inaccessible to the ordinary commercial cor-
poration, and furthermore the nature of the Canadian bond mortgage with
its "floating charge" and its "majority clause" permits effective consummation
of most reorganizations without statutory aid. See Fraser, Rcorgani.acion
of Companies in Canada (1927) 27 ColT L. REV. 933.
A Delaware Statute permitting a similar provision to be included in the
certificate of incorporation has never been interpreted, and apparently is never
used. DEm. LAws 1925, p. 272, § 1, p. 275, § 4. Similar statutes in Ohio and
Kentucky applying only to railway and bridge companies have not been before
the courts for interpretation either. OmO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 9092-
9095; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) c. 32, § 771-a.
The Kentucky statute expressly requires that the plan must take care of
dissenting creditors by "a provision for preserving and maintaining the right
of such holder so as not to impair the obligation of this contract." It is gener-
ally thought that the constitutional prohibition from impairing contracts and
the extraterritorial ineffectiveness of State discharge laws invalidate State
legislation similar to the English Statute. See in this connection recent statutes
on reorganization of insolvent banks. NEB. CoOP. STAT. (1929) § 8-181; KY.
STAT. (Carroll, 1932) c. 9b, § 165a-64. A reorganization under the Nebraska
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constitutional grant of power "to establish . . . uniform laws on the
Subject of Bankruptcies Throughout the United States," 16 has a free
hand in matters of composition and discharge in regard to which the
equity courts and State legislatures are helpless.
As anticipated, there has already been much clamor against the con-
stitutionality of the inclusion of corporate reorganization in the Bank-
ruptcy Act.16 The arguments regarding impairment of contracts and
denial of due process, as well as the more technical question of the scope
of the bankruptcy power, have already been thoroughly analyzed, 1 so that
a detailed discussion of the issues here would be largely repetitious. A
few salient points, however, may bear additional emphasis. The history
of the bankruptcy clause of the Constitution carries in its trail a host
of unsuccessful objections against the enactment of various provisions
which are now regarded as orthodox features of a bankruptcy law.1 s Par-
ticularly noteworthy in connection with the corporate reorganization
provision is the experience of the clause permitting composition before
adjudication.' 9 That such a provision is within the "Subject of Bank-
statute was held invalid by a federal district court as impairing the obligation
of contracts since it deprived depositors of the right of recourse against others
than the original debtor granted under prior bank laws. Hessen Siak Shams
v. Nebraska State Bank of Bloomfield, Neb., 48 F. (2d) 894 (D. Neb. 1931);
(1932) 45 HARV. L. RaV. at 1397. Cf. Dorman Banking Com'r v. Dell, 52 S.
W. (2d) 892 (Ky. 1932) where the constitutionality of the Kentucky statute was
considered.
15. U. S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8 (4). Most students of the subject, including
those who have denied the power of the courts to modify the contractual rela-
tions between the corporation and its various creditors and members, have
expressed the belief that these modifications can be imposed by federal legis-
lation under the bankruptcy power. Rosenberg, op. cit. supra, note 1; Swaino,
op. cit. supra note 9, at 131; Cutcheon, op. cit. supra note 2, at 75.
16. See JOINT HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCoMMITTEES OF THE COMIMITTEE ON
THE JUDICIARY CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES ON SENATeY BILL 3866, the bill
to amend the Bankruptcy Act (1932), Part 2, p. 339; Part 3, pp. 525, 567.
17. Rosenberg, op. cit. supra note 1; Kreft, The Powers of Congress Under
the Constitution over Debtor and Creditor Affairs (1931) 6 JouR. NAT. Assoc.
REF. IN BKRPCY. 11.
18. For a discussion and history of the litigation over the inclusion within
the "Subject of Bankruptcies" of provisions (1) for others than traders and
(2) for voluntary bankruptcies, see REMINGTON ON BANKRUPTCY (3rd ed. 1923)
§§ 8, 9. In regard to the extension of this power to the enactment of pro-
visions for compositions before adjudication, see id. § 3069. Any objection to
the inclusion within the Act of provisions for debtors or corporations not in-
solvent within the definition of the Bankruptcy Act, § 1 (15), is unwarranted,
since the equity definition of insolvency has been used in prior national Bank-
ruptcy Acts without successful constitutional objection, and even under the
present law a solvent debtor may voluntarily go into bankruptcy. Bank-
ruptcy Act, § 4.
19. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 12a, as amended in 1910; similar provision
in Act of 1867, § 43 as amended by Act of 1874, § 17.
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ruptcies" has not been questioned since the convincing opinion of Judge
Blatchford in the Reiman case.
20
The proposed section is fundamentally an extension of the benefits of
composition to corporate debtors. The present composition section, par-
ticularly since it has been most strictly construed, is inadequate to deal
with the complexities of reorganization plans.2' It is undeniable that
this inadequacy has excluded large corporations from the composition
privilege in bankruptcy afforded to ordinary individuals. Despite some
innovations inserted to meet the peculiar exigencies of a corporate com-
position, the proposed legislation is sufficiently analogous to the existing
composition provision to weather the constitutional bogey, it would seem.
The provisions affecting rights of stockholders seem justified to the extent
that they are incident to or necessary for effecting a composition with
creditors. The authorization to bind dissenting minority creditors and
stockholders to a composition or plan which may require them to accept
something other than cash or short-term notes in satisfaction of their
claims 22 is perhaps quite a novel feature. But the main purpose of the com-
position provision is to save the debtor from liquidation and to enable him
to continue in business under an adjustment approved by, and to the interest
of, the majority of the creditors. Although the original composition
clause required settlement in "money," and although the consideration
in practice is generally cash or notes, the language of the present composi-
tion provision is open to the interpretation that long-term notes or even cor-
porate securities may be offered as consideration for a composition, and
the meager court interpretations of this language have not settled the
issue to the contrary.2 3 If, as seems to be the case, it is almost impossible
20. In re Reiman, Fed. Cas. No. 11, 673 (S. D. N. Y. 1874) deciding upon
the constitutionality of the composition clause of the 1867 Bankruptcy Act.
See also In re Klein, (Circuit Court for Dist. of Mo.) reported in note to Nelson
v. Carland, 1 How. 265, 277 (U. S. 1843); Kunzler v. Kohaus, 5 Hill 317
(N. Y. 1843).
21. See Rosenberg, op. cit. supra note 9, at 14: "Compositions in bankruptcy
theoretically offer a way in which the will of a majority of unsecured creditors
may be imposed upon a dissenting minority, but the Bankruptcy Act is of little
practical service, since large reorganizations deal not only with secured as
well as unsecured creditors but also with the issue, readjustment and scaling
down of stock- The bankruptcy court, so far as the decisions go, has not
sufficient power to deal with these problems, nor can it give new money a lien
prior to existing claims." Also, see In re Frear, 120 Fed. 978 (N. D. N. Y.
1903); In re Berler Shoe Co., 246 Fed. 1018 (S. D. N. Y. 1917).
22. Draft, § 76 (b) (3), (g) (2) and (3).
23. RFMnNGTON oN BAxKRUp=, op. cit. supra note 18, § 3092: "The word-
ing of the section is very significant-the use of the word 'consideration'
instead of the word 'money' in the part that relates to what shall be deposited
for the creditors and the use of the word 'money' in the part that provides vhat
shall be deposited to pay costs and priority claims." But the courts have
shown a reluctance to force creditors to accept anything other than cash. In the
only case found under the composition provision in which the question of pay-
ing creditors' claims in corporate securities was directly before the court, the
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for a corporation to take advantage of the privilege of composition unless
it is authorized to settle claims by distributing securities in the reorganized
company, such authorization seems quite in keeping with the purpose of
our Bankruptcy Laws. At least, our Supreme Court in 1883 enforced a
Canadian statute against American security holders in a Canadian com-
pany compelling them to accept new securities under a reorganization
plan agreed to by the majority, declaring that such procedure was "no
more than is done in bankruptcy when a 'composition' agreement with the
bankrupt debtor, if assented to by the required majority of creditors, Is
made binding on the non-assenting minority." 24
As to the objection against impairment of contracts, it is settled that
this prohibition does not apply to the national legislative bodies.2 6 The
further requisite of due process is one that may not so easily be disposed
of. In the case above referred to, however, the Supreme Court expressed
the opinion that "in no just sense do such governmental regulations de-
prive a person of his property without due process of law. They simply
require each individual to so conduct himself for the general good as not
unnecessarily to injure another." 26
To say the least, there would seem to be argument to support a holding
by the Supreme Court that this section is constitutional. There is no
clear-cut authority for the argument of unconstitutionality. It is hard
to believe that the Supreme Court will be induced by abstract arguments
to hold these provisions unconstitutional unless the Court is convinced
that they are economically unsound or practically useless. Consideration,
therefore, of the substance and merits of the section would seem to be
of much more importance than the abstract question of constitutionality.2 7
court sidestepped the issue by declaring that the stock offered to creditors was
worthless and participation in the reorganized company an unfair risk to force
upon them under the particularly bad conditions of that case. In ro Woodend
& Co., 133 Fed. 593 (S. D. N. Y. 1904) ; of. In re Kinnane, 221 Fed. 762 (S. D.
Ohio 1915); In re Wayne Realty Co., 275 Fed. 955 (N. D. Ohio 1921). The
decisions are clear that a bid at the sale in bankruptcy by a group of creditors
with a plan of reorganization will not be permitted to force securities upon
dissenting creditors in payment of their claims. In re J. B. & J. M. Cornell
Co., 186 Fed. 859 (S. D. N. Y. 1911); In re Prudential Outfitting Co. of Dela-
ware, 250 Fed. 504 (S. D. N. Y. 1918). CooK ON CoRPoRATIoNs (8th ed. 1923)
§ 884.
24. Canada Southern Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527, 536 (1888).
25. See BLAcK ON CONSTITUTiONAL LAW (4th ed. 1927) § 271; RnMINGTON
ON BANKRUPTCY op. cit. supra note 18, § 14; Rosenberg, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 534-536. See also Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181, 188
(1901); Canada So. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, supra note 24, at 539.
26. Canada Southern Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, supra note 24, at 536.
27. An objection to the enactment of the proposed section probably meriting
more attention is that a possible extension of the jurisdiction of the federal
courts is involved. See JOINT HEARINGS, supra note 16, Part 2, p. 423. The
advisability of retaining the consent receiverships for purpose of reorganization
in the federal courts has been questioned. See Frankfurter, Dishribution of
[Vol. 4
Attention must first be drawn to the important limitation upon the
scope of the proposed section. It is made applicable only to "moneyed,
business or commercial" corporations other than "municipal, railroad,
insurance, or banking" corporations.28  These exclusions obviously greatly
limit the scope of the provision, since it is a well-known fact that the
majority of reorganization problems in this country arise in connection
with railroad reorganizations. However, reorganization plays an important
part in the life of large industrials, most of these reorganizations being
voluntary, i. e., consummated outside of court.2 9 The availability of an
effective judicial procedure for such reorganizations will supply a definite
need, if ony by lending support indirectly to voluntary reorganizations,
since it would deprive "strikers" and unreasonable recalcitrant parties
of a goodly portion of their power.30 It has been suggested that there
may be important economic reasons 31 for encouraging and facilitating
the reorganization of embarrassed industrial corporations instead of per-
mitting or forcing them to liquidate at the cost of displacing numerous
employees and sacrificing an investment which may be fundamentally
sound though temporarily in difficulty. If this be true, legislation facili-
tating corporate reorganization, even though limited to industrials, is
of no little moment.
Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts (1928) 13 CoMN.
L. Q. 499, at 526; Note (1927) 41 HARv. L. Rav. 70, 13. This point is of
particular moment at present in view of the pending bills to limit the jurisdiction
of the federal courts. See Comment (1932) 31 MIcH. L. REv. 59. The Norris-
La Guardia bill (S. B. No. 939, H. B. No. 11508) abolishing Federal jurisdiction
based on diversity of citizenship, recommended by the report of the Committee
on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, would eliminate the use of the
federal equity receivership for purposes of reorganization. The proposed addi-
tion to the Bankruptcy Act, however, would bring some of these cases into the
federal courts by another door. This, of course, will reduce the limiting effects
of the Norris-La Guardia bill. But if it be granted that federal jurisdiction in
reorganization cases is desirable, this indirect modification of the Norris bill
would be justified.
28. Apparently these exclusions were carried over from the provisions ex-
cluding these corporations from the rest of the Bankruptcy Act, § 4 (a) & (b)
. . . Furthermore, reorganizations of railroads are to some extent under
the control of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 41 STAT. 494 (1920),
49 U. S. C. § 20-a (1926); Comment (1931) 44 HARv. L. Ray. 838. It was
probably thought best by the draftsmen of this bill to leave this important
special field open for separate legislation. Senate Bill 4921, including railroads
within its scope, provides that railroad corporations engaged in interstate com-
merce obtain "the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission to the
extent required by law" before issuing securities. Sub-division (f) (6).
29. See Dewing, CORPORATE PROMOTIONS AND REORGANIZATIONS (1914); op.
cit. supra note 7, Bk. V, c. 8; Cravath, op. cit. supra note 2, at 213.
30. The "striker" difficulties in voluntary creditors' committee reorganiza-
tions are particularly vexing. See Dewing, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1159.
31. See Douglas & Weir, Equity Receiverships in the United States District
Court for Connecticut 1920-1929 (1930) 4 CONN. B. J. 1, 9.
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To return to the problems outlined at the beginning of this comment,
to what extent does the proposed section adopt or add to the existing
judicial machinery for effecting reorganizations, and how sound are the
measures it proposes?
In regard to the machinery for adjudicating the fairness of the reor-
ganization plan so that it will be insured against belated attack, the
proposed section effectively provides this practically in same manner used
in the federal equity courts in connection with the foreclosure decree.8 2
But the section improves upon the existing procedure by affording a much
better opportunity for securing a fair plan. Under the present system,
the plan must necessarily be formulated and majority adherence obtained
before the plan can come into court because all must be in readiness to
bid at the sale, this being the only generally recognized means available
to effect a judicial reorganization. This means that the plan has practi-
cally been in force perhaps two or three years before it reaches the court
which naturally feels reluctant to set the plan aside at so late a date, even
though it is admitted that a more sound and just plan might well have
been made.33 The proposed section permits of the court coming into the
picture quite early in the game. The corporation may come directly into
court for the purpose of reorganization, and a plan accepted by only
twenty-five per cent of any class of creditors and ten per cent of all
creditors may be proposed by any creditor or the debtor for consideration
at a hearing duly noticed for that purpose. 84 Before the plan can be con-
firmed there must be written acceptance on the part of creditors holding
two-thirds in amount of the claims of each class to be affected by the
plan (unless a sale or appraisal provision is made, in which event the
two-thirds consent is unnecessary), and on the part of two-thirds of the
stockholders where the corporation is not insolvent in the bankruptcy
sense.35 Upon the fling of the requisite acceptance, the judge must hear
such objections as may be made to the plan and must satisfy himself that
the plan is equitable before he confirms it.30 To aid him in the determina-
tion of the fairness of the plan, the judge is authorized to "require the
debtor to file such schedules and submit such other information . . . as
may be necessary to disclose the conduct of the debtor's affairs and the
32. Draft, § 76 (c) (4) provides that the judge "shall determine a reasonable
time within which the claims and interests of creditors and stockholders may
be filed or evidenced and after which no such claim or interest may participate
in any plan, except on order, for cause shown." Section 76 (h) provides that
"upon confirmation of the plan the property . . . shall be transferred by
the trustee . . . to the reorganized corporation or the new corporation . . .
free and clear of all claims of the debtor, its stockholders and creditors except
such as may consistently with the provisions of the plan be reserved in the
order or decree directing such transfer."
33. See, for example, Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Reorganization, 131
I. C. C. 673, 694 (1928).
34. Draft § 76 (d).
35. Id. § 76 (e).
36. Id. § 76 (f) (1).
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fairness of any proposed plan." 37 Furthermore there must be filed with
the acceptances of the plan "a statement showing what . . . claims and
shares of stock have been purchased or transferred by those accepting
the plan after the commencement or in contemplation of the proceeding
and the circumstances of such purchase or transfer." 38
No sale is necessary so far as unsecured creditors are concerned if the
requisite proportion of acceptance is obtained, and even if this acceptance
is not obtained, as well as in the case where secured creditors are involved,
there need be no sale provided the plan offers protection for all dissenters
by way of "appraisal and payment in cash of the value of such liens and
claims or at the objecting creditors' election, of the securities allotted to
such liens and claims under the plan" 3-apparently adopting the procedure
of CorieZ v. White.40 The exclusion of the necessity for a public sale has
been thought desirable.l There has not yet been sufficient investigation or
analysis of the implications of this procedure to justify a conclusive view
as to its desirability. A sale has some utility as a procedure to determine
the distributive share of dissenters in industrial reorganizations. Whether
entrusting valuation to the court and eliminating the judicial sale will be
satisfactory is still an open question.
The most significant provisions of the proposed amendment concern the
compulsion upon the minority to accept a fair plan approved by the
majority. In regard to unsecured creditors, the section apparently codifies
the procedure of the Phipps case. Subdivision (b) (3) provides that the
plan may include "the issuance of securities . . . for cash, or in exchange
for existing securities, or in satisfaction of claims or rights." Subdivision
(g) (3) further provides that a plan confirmed by the court "shall be
binding upon . . . all unsecured creditors, provided two-thirds in amount
of the unsecured creditors shall have accepted the plan in writing filed
in the proceeding." These provisions are obviously, and doubtless pur-
posely, left open to the interpretation that unsecured creditors may under
the prescribed circumstances be compelled to accept securities in lieu of
a cash dividend.
However, these provisions are not open to Mr. Swaine's criticism that
it would be economically unsound to permit a court, necessarily inex-
perienced in the intricacies of corporate finance, to formulate the plan of
37. Id. § 76 (c) (3).
38. Id. § 76 (e). Senate Bill 4921, § 73 (e) (5) contains the proviso to this
requirement "that if the Judge is satisfied by reason of the number of securitie3
,outstanding and the extent of the public dealing therein the preparation of such
a statement would be impractical, he may direct that it be not filed."
39. Id. § 76 (f) (5).
40. Supra note 3.
41. Comment (1932) 45 HARV. L. REv. 697, 699: "A public sale entails a
considerable waste of the debtor corporation's assets; the cost of organizing the
mew corporation is only one of the expenses involved. It may even jeopardize
the ultimate success of the reorganization by causing an undue delay. The
creditor, moreover, has little to gain by it . . . An appraisal without a sole
would accomplish precisely the same result."
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reorganization for the parties.42 The compulsion cannot be exercised at
the mere whim of the court, but only when the plan has been endorsed by
the specified majority of parties affected and has also been approved as
equitable by the court. In other words, instead of merely the court and
the reorganization managers deciding upon the compulsion, as thet, im-
plications of the Phipps case might permit, a large majority of creditors
must support this action, and the minority dissenters are provided the
opportunity to place before the court their objections in regard to the
fairness of the plan.
The more cogent objection made by many to such a provision, namely,
that an ordinary creditor should not be precluded from taking his Ino
rata share of the liquidation value of the corporate assets and should not
be forced into becoming an investor,43 still remains. This objection is
much wdightier, moreover, where an industrial or commercial corpora-
tion is concerned than where a railroad or public utility is involved. The
public interest in maintaining private industrial and commercial enter-
prises as going concerns has not yet been sufficiently demonstrated to
produce the general feeling that the corporate enterprise should be per-
petuated at the sacrifice of the individual creditor's rights. 44 It is, of
course, possible to carry this solicitude for individual creditors so far
as to require the corporation to liquidate if it is unable to raise money
for the purpose of paying off dissenters in full. But if the industrial
corporation is required to offer dissenting creditors a substantial cash
alternative, the possibility of industrial reorganizations is very narrowly
limited.45 Furthermore, financial assistance is apt to be much less readily
forthcoming if a large sum must be diverted from the enterprise to pay
off dissenters. It seems, then, that unless the existing strict limitation
upon reorganization of industrials is to be maintained, the provision of
the proposed section is a necessary one.
It should be noted that the proposed section does not go beyond the
Phipps case to the extent to which some would carry the doctrine of that
case.46 While unsecured creditors may be forced to accept securities in
lieu of a cash dividend, secured creditors, dissenting from the plan, are
entitled upon seasonable request, to have their liens upon the corporate
property protected in one of three ways: "(a) by the sale of such prop-
erty subject to such liens and claims, or (b) by a sale free of such liens
42. Swaine, op. cit. supra note 9, 22 CoL. L. Rnv. at 130-131.
43. The unsecured creditor "has advanced credit to the corporation with a
view to a cash return upon possible liquidation; not to the potential necessity of
investing in the stock of his customer or even in his notes." Comment (1932)
41 YALE L. J. 577, 581.
44. See supra note 31.
45. See Dewing, op. cit. supra note 10.
46. Rosenberg, op. cit. supra note 9, 24 CoL. L. Rav. at 271: "The power of
the Court to deal in like manner with secured creditors has not been expressly
adjudicated but the theory of the Boyd case and the Phipps case would seem
to apply with at least equal force to secured creditors as it does to unsecured
creditors."
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and claims at not less than a fair upset price, and the transfer of such
liens and claims to the proceeds of such sale, or (ce) by appraisal and
payment in cash of the value of such liens and claims, or, at the objecting
creditors' election, of the securities allotted to such liens and claims under
the plan." 47
Convincing arguments have been made in favor of the power to modify
secured claims as well as unsecured oness The draftsmen of the pro-
posed bill, however, apparently influenced by the traditional ideology of
"absolute priority" and "tenancy in common" in regard to mortgage bonds
and by the general policy of the Bankruptcy Act to leave property Hens
unaffected,49 did not see fit to venture this far. Moreover, since mortgage
bond issues are not so common in the industrial corporate financial struc-
ture as they are in railroad financing,50 the importance of extending the
doctrine of the Phipps case to secured creditors was not so impelling.
The machinery provided by the section does avoid the cumbersome fore-
closure proceedings of the federal equity courts 51 and furthermore, extends
the application of the procedure of the Coriel case, whereby no sale at
all need be held, to secured creditors. This provision goes beyond the
Coriel case and the Phipps case in both of which cases there were only
ordinary unsecured creditors involved.52  It is to be regretted that the
proposed bill does not in any way define the method of appraisal to be used.
The proposal of the Coriel case, that the appraisal of the claims should
be made on the basis of the sum which the corporate assets would bring
if sold at a public sale, is not incorporated in the section, nor is any other
of the numerous possible bases adopted. The appraisal might be based
on the capitalization of the new or reorganized company, or upon the
liquidation value of the old company, or upon the value of the old com-
47. Draft, § 76 (f) (5). Any one of these provisions may be used in lieu
of the two-thirds consent requirement in regard to any class or classe3 of un-
secured creditors. § 76 (e).
48. "It is possible that relatively harsher treatment may be accorded those
interests which have become permanently connected with the 'going concern'
than that accorded to temporary creditors since the former can be considered
as committed to the enterprise, participating in its successes and bearing the
burden of its failures. . . ." Bonbright & Bergerman, Two Rival Theorics of
Priority Rights (1928) 28 CoL. L. REv. 127, 153n. See, also, Rosenberg, op. cit.
supra note 46; Spring, op. cit. supra note 3.
49. Supra note 3; Bankruptcy Act § 67d.
50. See Dewing, op. cit. supra, note 7, at 1104.
51. The sale free from liens or the sale subject to liens have long been
familiar to the bankr-uptcy courts. REmnNGTON ON BANKRUPTCy, op. cit. "upra
note 18, §§ 2575-2585. The bankruptcy court is not hampered by the burden-
some and ambiguous act of Congress of 1893, c. 225, 27 STAT. *751, 28 U. S. C. A.
§§ 847, 848, 849, which applies to the foreclosure sales in the federal equity
courts. Israels, Reorganization Sales; Section 847 of thc Judicial Codo (1932)
32 Cor L. Rnv. 668; Robertson v. Howard, 229 U. S. 254, 260 (1913).
52. See supra notes 8, 9.
COMMENTS19331
YALE LAW JOURNAL
pany as a going concern.53 This failure to establish a standard of valua-
tion or to indicate partiality for any of the divergent methods of appraisal
which have been used dodged one of the biggest problems of reorganiza-
tion. The alternative offered the creditor in this situation to accept the
value of the securities allotted him under the plan instead of the appraisal
value of his liens or claims against the old company, is of very dubious
soundness, as has been pointed out earlier in this comment, since it is apt
to encolurage security holders to elect cash in such numbers as to defeat
the reorganization.5 4
When the corporation is not insolvent in the bankruptcy sense, stock-
holders' rights must also be given consideration.S5 The distribution of
the shareholders' equity in this case involves further difficult questions.90
The full import of the provision of the proposed section requiring, before
confirmation of the plan, consent on the part of stockholders holding two-
thirds in amount of the stock cannot readily be ascertained without con-
siderably more study of stockholders' status and rights in the corporation
in general than the limitations of this discussion would permit. 0 Ap-
parently the section embraces cases of so-called stockholders' reorganiza-
tion which can be effected under statutes in most states by a sale or
transfer of the corporate assets in exchange for securities in the new or
transferee corporation, if a specified majority of the stock consent. The
state statutes generally provide that dissentient stockholders have the
right to an appraisal and payment in cash of the value of their stock.67
The proposed section would apparently abrogate the right to appraisal and
payment in cash and would compel minority dissenters to accept the securi-
ties allotted to them. Also, probably agreements as to surrender of stock,
or waiver of priority, or creation of new preferred stock-customary sac-
rifices asked of stockholders 8 - may be forced upon minority dissenters.
53. See Bonbright, The Problem of Judicial Valuation (1927) 27 COL. L. REv.
493, 514, 519.
54. Supra, note 11. "It is evident that this option permits the creditors to
share in the increased value of the corporate properties resulting from their
transfer to a new corporation pursuant to the reorganization plan while relieving
them of its speculative burdens. Such an outcome is clearly undesirable."
Comment (1932) 41 YALE L. J., 577, 582.
55. Diraft, § 76 (e): "A plan shall not be confirmed until its has been
accepted in writing filed in the proceeding . . . unless the debtor shall be
determined to be insolvent, by or on behalf of stockholders of the debtor holding
-two-thirds of the stock of each class. . .
56. Speaking of the treatment of stockholders in voluntary reorganizationg
Mr. Cravath says: "It is in dealing with the stock and vith the rights of
stockholders that the most difficult and perplexing questions are apt to arise."
Op. cit. supra note 2, at 214.
57. See Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Stockholders (1927) 27 Co. L, RVV,
547; Lattin, Equitable Limitations on Statutory or Charter Powers Given to
Majority Stockholders (1931) 30 MicH. L. Ruv. 645; Remedies of Dissenting
Stockholders under Appraisal Statutes (1931) 45 HARY. L. REV. 233.
58. In regard to the difficulties involved in effecting these measures under
present conditions, see Cravath, op. cit. supra note 2, at 214-216.
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Whether the proposed legislation goes beyond this and permits the levy of
an assessment upon a dissenting minority if the requisite majority agree to
pay it cannot be ascertained. The language is susceptible of this interpreta-
tion. It may as well be taken to mean, however, that refusal to pay an
assessment will result in forfeiture of the stockholder's equity.
It should be noted that in these cases where the corporation is not
"determined to be insolvent" in the bankruptcy sense, no plan can be
confirmed without the two-thirds stockholders' consent. There is no alter-
native provision that can be made in their regard as in the case of credi-
tors.59 It may well be questioned whether the two-thirds consent require-
ment may not in many cases where the stockholders' equity is small attri-
bute to them a bargaining power disproportionate to the value of their
equity.
Before concluding, a few of the obvious advantages of the proposed
bankruptcy provision over the present equity receivership should be em-
phasized. Under the Bankruptcy Act,6 0 the trustee takes title to all prop-
erty wherever located, thus avoiding the conflicts and expense of ancillary
receiverships. The possibility that a few unfriendly creditors may obstruct
the consummation of a plan by petitioning the corporation into bankruptcy
and forced liquidation 01 is obviated. "Tyranny and extravagance" on the
part of reorganization committees is less possible under the proposed bill
since the court must pass on the fairness of the plan and upon the rea-
sonableness of the amounts paid for services or expenses incident to the
reorganization.6 The "stupid and burdensome statute" 0 of 1893 does
not apply to sales under the Bankruptcy Act G4 so that if the reorganization
plan is executed by way of sale rather than by the other means afforded
by the provision dispensing with the sale, the procedure is far more simple
and direct than is possible in the federal equity courts.05
There is no doubt, from the legal point of view, that the proposed legis-
lation, despite the limitations and omissions, will simplify and improve
upon the machinery of the equity courts for effecting corporate reorgani-
zations. The significance of such legislation, from the business and eco-
nomic viewpoints, is a matter meriting further study. B.M.
59. Supra note 47.
60. § 70a.
61. Supra, note 10.
62. Draft, § 76 (f) (1) & (2).
63. Rosenberg, op. cit. supra note 1, at 525.
64. Supra, note 51.
65. Senate Bill 4921, in addition to the provisions of Bill 3866, contains
provisions for the protection and compensation of a receiver appointed by a
State or Federal Court prior to the institution of proceedings under the Bank-
ruptcy Act, Subdivision (i); for the transfer of property from the bankruptcy
court to an existing State or Federal Court receiver in cases where the suit
under the bankruptcy provision is dismissed because no plan is proposed, ac-
cepted and confirmed within a reasonable time, Subdivision (i); and for the
procedure in cases where liquidation is ordered, Subdivision (k).
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STATE TAXATION OF MOTOR VEHICLES ENGAGED IN
INTERSTATE COMMERCE
THE statement that the regulation of interstate and intrastate commerce
by motor vehicle is one of the grave social problems of the day no longer
requires corroboration by reference to statistics.1 Included in the numer-
ous ramifications of the general problem of regulation 2 is the question of
the power of the states to impose taxes upon interstate commerce by motor
vehicle. For state taxation imposed upon operators or vehicles engaged
in interstate commerce by motor vehicle to be valid under the commerce
clause of the Constitution,3 three general requirements must be met. The
tax must be imposed for a proper purpose, it must be reasonable in
amount, and it must not be discriminatory against interstate commerce.
State taxes upon interstate commerce by motor vehicle fall broadly into
two classes; namely, those taxes imposed only upon users of the highways
for hire, and those taxes, such as operator's license fees and vehicle
registration fees, imposed upon all users whether for hire or not.4
Such taxes, whether of one class or the other, if they are to be sustained
at all, must not impinge, conceptually at least, upon the established doctrine
of constitutional law that a state may not tax the privilege of engaging
in interstate commerce; for this principle, as an abstract proposition,
knows no exception. 5 To sustain state taxes upon interstate commerce
by motor vehicle without contravention of this doctrine, grounds have
been found which have their basis in the fact that the states own and
control the highways. Power to control the roads in the interest of public
safety and order has been held to extend, in the absence of federal legis-
lation predmpting the field,0 to interstate as well as intrastate commerce,
1. Prefatory statistics are given in Lilienthal and Rosenbaum, Motor
Carrier Regulation by Certificates of Necessity and Convenienco (1926) 36
YALE L. J. 163, and Brown and Scott, Regulation of the Contract Motor Carrier
under the. Constitution (1931) 44 HARV. L. REv. 530; or refer to Bus FAcTS
FOR 1931 (National Association of Motor Bus Operators) for later figures.
2. For discussions of many of these problems see Lilienthal and Rosenbaum,
supra note 1; Lilienthal and Rosenbaum, Motor Carrier Regulation; Federal,
State and Municipal (1926) 26 CoL. L. REv. 954; and Brown and Scott, aupra
note 1 (authors counsel for National Automobile Chamber of Commerce).
3. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4. Users for hire are "privileged" users whereas other users are users of
"right." See Comment (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 469 for the meaning of the
difference.
5. Interstate °Transit, Incorporated v. Lindsey, 283 U. S. 183, 185 (1931);
Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163 (1928). This is so regardless of how small
the tax is. Cudahy Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U. S. 460, 467 (1929).
6. For contemplated federal legislation see (1931) 31 COL. L. RaV. 1025;
Lilienthal and Rosenbaum, supra note 2, at 980 et seq. For suggested condi-
tions to the subsidization of state roads under the Federal Highway Act, see
(1931) 40 YALE L. J. 469, 474. The federal government will doubtless never
attempt to establish a complete system of control over interstate commerce by
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and has been held to include the incidental power to exact from all alike
the funds necessary to effect control. And there is the added power,
springing from ownership of the roads, to exact from all users of the
roads alike, compensation for their use.7 But so far as interstate commerce
is concerned, these have been the limits of the power of the state to impose
taxes in return for use of the roads. For state taxes on such commerce
to be valid they must be for these purposes alone and must be no more
onerous than is reasonably necessary. If the state cannot show one or
both of these general purposes, then a tax imposed upon interstate oper-
ators 8 for the privilege of using the roads will be invalid without the
necessity of proof by the operator either that the tax is discriminatory
or that it is unreasonable. At least the only two Supreme Court cases
precisely in point so indicate.9
In Sprout v. South Bend,' a license fee of $50 was imposed upon all
busses of a certain seating capacity plying South Bend streets for hire.
There was no showing either that the fee was exacted to defray the costs
of supervision and administration or that the sum demanded was reasonable
for such purpose. There was no allocation of the proceeds to street main-
tenance or construction; nor was there any apparent relationship between
use of the streets and the size of the fee. The Supreme Court held that
the exaction of the license fee under these circumstances could not be
sustained "either as an inspection fee or as an excise for the use of the
streets of the city," 1 and that it was accordingly invalid as to an operator
in interstate commerce.1 2 In Interstate Transit, Incorporated V. Lindscy,1 3
a Tennessee statute purported, inter alia, to impose a privilege tax upon
motor vehicle, so that some state supervision will continue to be permissible
even after Congress acts.
7. Federal legislation would not put an end to this power unless surrender
of the power to tax should be made a condition to further federal assistance
under the Federal Highway Act. The provision in section 9 of the act against
exacting "tolls" has been held not to apply to taxes imposed to defray the costs
of supervision and road maintenance and construction; see Carley & Hamilton
v. Snook, 281 U. S. 66, 74 (1930): "It cannot be supposed that Congress in-
tended to procure the abandonment by the states of this well recognized type
of taxation (vehicle registration fees) without more explicit language than
that prohibiting tolls found in § 9."
8. "Interstate operator" as herein used means "operator in interstate com-
merce." An operator would not have to cross state lines at all to be an
operator in interstate commerce. "Intrastate operator" similarly means "oper-
ator in intrastate commerce."
9. Interstate Transit, Incorporated v. Lindsey, 283 U. S. 183 (1931); Sprout
v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163 (1928).
10. 277 U. S. 163 (1928).
11. 277 U. S. 163, 170 (1928).
12. The defendant Sprout was also engaged in intrastate commerce, but
the Court held that this fact was immaterial in view of the fact that it did
not appear that Sprout could have avoided the tax by withdrawing entirely
from his intrastate business; 277 U. S. 163, 171 (1928).
13. 283 U. S. 183 (1931).
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interstate bus lines.14 The statute was a general revenue measure exacting
taxes for the privilege of engaging in numerous occupations and allocating
the proceeds of such taxes to the general fund of the state. The plaintiff
was required under the statute to pay for its interstate bus business a
tax of $500 per bus operated by it across Tennessee highways. As in
the Sprout case there was no showing that the tax was imposed to defray
reasonable inspection costs; nor was there any affirmative 15 showing that
the tax was intended as compensation for use of the roads, since there
was no allocation of the tax to highway purposes and since the tax to
be paid by any operator was measured by the number and carrying
capacity of his busses,16 a standard of measurement having no relationship
to use of the roads. The Supreme Court held that the tax was therefore
invalid as applied to interstate commerce, stating that there was no need
in the absence of a showing of a proper purpose to "consider whether
the tax exacted from this appellant is unreasonably large or unjustly
discriminatory." 17
Hence it seems that an interstate operator, simply by setting up a
state statute exacting a tax from him for use of the roads in interstate
commerce, thereby invalidates the tax as to such commerce unless the
person charged with the collection of the tax can show "affirmatively"
that the tax is assessed for a proper purpose. As to' taxes exacted to
defray the expenses of regulation and inspection, such an affirmative
showing might well be made by evidence outside the taxation statute.18
But it would be more difficult to make such a showing of a purpose to
14. Several types of intrastate and interstate bus businesses were enumer-
ated under the statute, but the standard of measurement was the same for
all, 283 U. S. 183, 187 (1931).
15. Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the court stated that: "the tax can-
not be sustained unless it appears affirmatively, in some way, that it is levied
only as compensation for use of the highways or to defray the expense of
regulating motor traffic. This may be indicated by the nature of the imposi-
tion, such as a mileage tax directly proportioned to the use, . . . or by the
express allocation of the proceeds of the tax to highway purposes, . . . or
otherwise."
16. The tax per bus in addition to vehicle registration fees was as follows,
TENN. ACTS (1927) c. 89 § 4:
Capacity Amount





over 30 " 750.
17. 283 U. S. 183, 190 (1931).
18. In American Motor Coach System v. Philadelphia, 28 F. (2d) 736 (0.
C. A. 3d, 1928), where a $50 license fee was imposed for each bus using the
city streets for hire, the court held that the necessary showing of purpose wag
made by proof that the $50 figure was arrived at before the ordinance was
drawn up as the result of an estimate of the costs of regulation.
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exact compensation for use of the roads by evidence aliunde unless proof
of a purpose to exact from each operator of a group the average cost
to the state per member of the group would suffice.10
There are apparently several methods whereby a legislative body may
insure the presence of the necessary evidence within the taxation statute.
Perhaps the most definite way is by allocating the proceeds of the tax
to highway purposes. 20 Though a simple statement contained in the act
to the effect that the tax is assessed to compensate for use of the highways
might be so included for the purpose of deception, no doubt it would
satisfy the preliminary requirement of purpose regardless of the fund
to which the tax was allocated.21 In the absence of a statement of purpose
and of allocation to highway purposes, a proper purpose would be indicated
by any standard for measuring the tax having some logical relationship
to use of the state highways 22 such as a flat fee to cover the costs entailed
19. Where the tax is proportioned to use, evidence outside the statute would
not be necessary, as is later indicated. Where it is not proportioned to use,
it will more nearly represent the actual costs to the state of each operator's
use if intended to defray inspection costs than if intended to serve as com-
pensation for use. Hence, there are grounds for a difference in attitude as
to evidence outside the statute. But since the only result of a preliminary
showing of purpose is to put the' burden on the interstate operator to show
unreasonableness or unjust discrimination, Interstate Transit, Incorporated v.
Lindsey, 283 U. S. 183, 186 (1931), evidence of a purpose to exact average
costs per vehicle might be accepted as a sufficient preliminary showing of pur-
pose in either case.
20. Compare Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554 (1927), where there was such
allocation, with Interstate Transit, Incorporated v. Lindsey, 283 U. S. 183
(1931) where such allocation was missing. Allocation to highway purposes
indicated a proper general purpose in Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610
(1915) and Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160 (1916) where vehicle registra-
tion and driver's license fees not proportioned to use of roads were upheld.
21. S. D. SEssloN LAws (1931) c. 183, § 6 provide that: "the following
license fee and compensation for the use of the highway shall be paid an-
nually . . . " See Prouty v. Coyne, 55 F. (2d) 289, 293 (D. S. D. 1932),
stating that this is a sufficient preliminary showing of purpose to put the
burden of proof upon the contesting interstate operator. (1931) 31 COL L.
REv. 1025, 1030 cites Interstate Transit, Incorporated v. Lindsey, 283 U. S.
183 (1931) as indicating that such a statement would be sufficient.
22. Such standards of measurement are indicated in the following cases:
Interstate Busses Corporation v. Blodgett, 276 U. S. 245 (1928) (one cent per
mile) (also allocation to highway purposes); Broadway Express v. Murray,
60 F. (2d) 293 (W. D. Okla. 1932) (one-half cent per mile for class B operators,
two-fifths of a cent per mile for class A operators) (also allocation of pro-
ceeds); Louis v. Boynton, 53 F. (2d) 471 (D. Kan. 1931) (5/10 mill per gross
ton-mile) (also allocation of proceeds); Roachell v. Gates, 47 S. W. (2d) 35
(Ark. 1932) (4% of gross income multiplied by the ratio of Arkansas mileage
to total mileage); State v. Public Service Commission, 242 N. W. 668 (Wis.
1932) (1 to 2 mills per ton-mile). See 50 TRAinc WoRLD 159 (1932) for dis-
cussion of the new Louisiana tax upon vehicles for hire. Vehicle registration
fees are measured by carrying capacity and horsepower. Operators for hire
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per user regardless of the amount of use, plus a ton-mile tax for which
the unit rate per ton-mile varied with the gross weight of vehicle and
load.23 Mr. Justice Brandeis intimated in the Interstate Transit case that
the Supreme Court might possibly be satisfied with a standard of measure-
ment having as rough a relationship to use of the highways as one
proportioning the amount of the tax to the number of passengers carried,
without consideration of the distance traveled by each passenger. 24 But
a standard of measurement based upon seating or carrying capacity,
maximum weight, horsepower or the like and not varying with mileage
or with some factor varying with mileage,25 would not bear the necessary
relationship; nor would a flat rate for all vehicles or operators.
Should the requisite "affirmative" showing of a proper general purpose
be made by proof of the statute alone, or by proof of facts outside the
statute, the burden would then be upon the interstate operator to show
either that the tax is unreasonable or else that it is discriminatory against
interstate commerce. 26 In considering the reasonableness or unreasonable-
ness of state taxes imposed upon interstate operators because of their
use of the roads, it is not material whether the operator is subjected to
one or several taxes which have use of the highways as the basis of their
validity.27  Yet, each must be reasonable for the particular purpose for
which it is intended; and, where more than one are intended for the
same purpose, the total charge for that purpose must be no more than
reasonable. 28
pay an additional 50% of the vehicle registration fee but are entitled to re-
funds as follows:
Distance travelled per annum Amount of refund
Less than 5,000 mi. 3/4 of the 50% extra fee
" " 10,000 " 1/2 '1 1 99 1 19
" " 20,000 " 1/3 " " I it U
" " 30,000 " 1/4 " " " "9 "1
30,000 mi. or more none
Such a statute would doubtless satisfy the requirement of purpose, though the
relationship of the amount of the tax to use is a rough one.
23. Standards of measurement could be devised with even greater precision
but would be somewhat less workable.
24. 283 U. S. 183, 190 (1931).
25. A tax measured by the number of passengers carried would vary with
mileage only in so far as the average distance travelled per passenger approxi-
mated the same figure for all the bus lines subject to the tax. The same would
be true as to a tax measured by tons of freight carried.
26. Interstate Transit, Incorporated v. Lindsey, 283 U. S. 183, 180 (1931).
27. Interstate Busses Corporation v. Blodgett, 276 U. S. 245 (1928). Nor
is the mere fact that fewer kinds of taxes are imposed upon the intrastate
operator than upon the interstate operator material, ibid.
28. Thus, if an interstate operator should bring his own gasoline into a
state and there use it in his own business, he would not be subject to a sales
tax but would seemingly be subject to a use tax if the proceeds were devoted
to highway purposes; State v. Johnson, 173 La. 669, 138 So. 503 (1931). of.
Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U. S. 245 (1929); also Boeing Air Transport v. Edel-
man, 61 F. (2d) 319 (C. C. A. 10th, 1932) reversing in part 51 F. (2d) 130
A claim of unreasonableness might well arise even though the tax or
taxes imposed upon the interstate operator were no more than the actual
cost to the state entailed by his use of the roads. In such a case the argu-
ment would have to be addressed to the question of the reasonableness of
the costs incurred by the state. As to actual pavement expenses, the ex-
penses of supervision on the road, and other expenses directly entailed by
use of the roads, no question would arise where the charges were no more
than the costs entliled by the interstate operator, for the reason that the
courts would doubtless accept as reasonable any system of direct super-
vision devised by the legislative body. But a question might well arise as
to fees charged for the preparation of voluminous papers, and for hearings
and examinations before commissions and the like, if the fees should be
large because of the elaborateness of the administrative system. A case
is suggested by the Oklahoma statute2 0 litigated in BroadwCay Express
v. Murray.30 The statute provides, ihter alic, that a certain class of
motor carriers for hire must pay, in addition to vehicle registration fees,
a license fee of $100 plus a tax of one-half cent per mile of highway
traversed. Assuming that the administrative expense incident to the
examination of each applicant under the statute exhausts the entire $100
fee whether the prospective operator desires to traverse a very few or
many miles of state highway, an operator contemplating but limited use
of the roads for hire in interstate commerce might well contend that in
a case such as his such an elaborate and expensive administrative pro-
cedure is not justified if at his expense. The attitude of the Supreme
Court in regard to such a contention would depend upon the keenness of
its desire to protect the small operator. A very recent case 31 may indicate
a sentiment on the part of the Court that the whole problem of motor
transportation could best be solved if only relatively few large operators
had to be dealt with. If that feeling actually pervades the Court, it would
perhaps say that the practical necessity for uniformity justifies the estab-
lishment of a single system of administration for all in a general class,
even though the occasional applicant suffers thereby.
Where the total of all charges based upon use of the roads exceeds the
actual cost to the state entailed by an interstate operator's use, it may be
stated as a general proposition that such a fact should render the tax
(D. Wyo. 1931); noted in (1932) 45 HARv. L. Ruv. 385. Likewise registration
fees above the costs of regulation would have to be as compensation for high-
way purposes. Where an interstate operator paid "use" taxes on gas, vehicle
registration taxes and additional taxes for use for hire, the total of all taxes
predicated upon use of the highways would have to be no more than reason-
able.
29. OmA. SESSION LAws (1929) c. 254, §§ 5 and 9.
30. 60 F. (2d) 293 (W. D. 0kla. 1932).
31. Stephenson v. Binford, Sup. Ct. Dec. 63 (U. S. 1932), in which a Texas
statute providing for the regulation of rates of intrastate contract carriers was
upheld. Cf. Brown and Scott, supra note 1, at 551. It has been stated that
if the statute should be upheld it would result in the displacement of the small




invalid as to him, since a profit accruing to the state from its dealings
with an interstate operator would amount to taxation of the privilege of
using the highways. But practical considerations necessitate occasional
obfuscation of this general doctrine in order to permit the assessment
of taxes by a feasible scheme.
Although the fequirement of a standard based upon use of the roads
in the case of those taxes, such as vehicle registration and driver's license
fees, which are imposed upon all operators, 2 might be impracticable, such
a requirement in the case of additional taxes imposed upon users of the
roads for hire, because of the comparative smallness of that group,8
could be more easily complied with.34 Considering the size of the average
charges per operator, there is a strong argument in favor of requiring
that many of the taxes upon vehicles for hire be proportioned to use.3
But this argument does not exist as to the smaller fees charged for such
use,36 nor does it exist in general as to vehicle registration or driver's
license fees. Yet,,because of the great increase in the amount of vehicle
registration fees for the larger busses and trucks,87 proportionment to
use has been required in the case of the larger registration fees.08 And
perhaps the Supreme Court might be persuaded so to decide 0 though the
question of the unreasonableness of vehicle registration fees to be paid
by interstate operators has not been before the Court since Kane v. New
Jersey 40 was decided in 1916.
When a standard of measurement not proportioned to use is permissi-
ble, the actual use made of the roads by various individuals paying the
32. There are nearly 26 million motor vehicles in the United States; (1932)
11 Bus TRANSPORTATION 349; of which 3,466,303 are trucks and 98,900 are
busses; (1932) 50 TRAFFIc WonLD 389.
33. 45,400 busses are operated for hire, (1932) 11 Bus TRANSPORTATION 64.
It is not known exactly how many of the 3,466,303 trucks are operated for
hire.
34. For example, in Texas, out of 206,000 trucks only 5,500 or less have a
rated carrying capacity of over 7,000 pounds; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S.
374 (1932). The heavier registration fees would ordinarily fall on approxi-
mately such a proportion of the total group.
35. The tax in Interstate Transit, Incorporated v. Lindsey, 283 U. S. 183
(1931) was $500 per bus of capacity from 21 to 30 passengers. In Clark
v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554 (1927), the additional tax for hire for a 31/ ton truck
traveling over a regular route was $200; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) §
614-94.
36. For example, the $5 license fee charged users for hire in State v.
Public Service Commission, supra note 22, in addition to a ton-mile tax which
would be proportioned to use.
37. For example, the South Dakota registration fee for a truck weighing
9,000 pounds is $400 per annum. Prouty v. Coyne, supra note 21. The Ohio
registration fee on a five ton truck jumped from $90.50 in 1926 (Olio GEN.
CODS (Page, 1926) § 6292-1) to $155 in 1931 (Onio GEN. CODS (Page, 1931
Supp.) § 6192-1).
38. Prouty v. Coyne, supra note 21.
39. But see the additional discussion infra as to this point.
40. 242 U. S. 160 (1916).
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same tax may vary considerably. The result is that the less frequent users
pay more than the cost entailed by their use, so that the state derives a
profit from the tax on them even though no profit results from the tax
on all users as a whole.41 But such a tax is apparently reasonable so
long as the total tax collected from all users does not materially exceed
the total expense incurred by the state.42
Even though a tax imposed upon an interstate operator is proportioned
to use it is not ipso facto reasonable, since the essential purpose is to
equate the tax charged per unit of use by the interstate operator with
the cost entailed to the state per unit of use. Hence, even where the tax
is proportioned to use, the interstate operator should theoretically be able,
by showing that the amount exacted exceeds the cost to the state, to
invalidate the tax as unreasonable. As a practical matter, however, this
abstract power is of small value to the operator. One reason is that when
the Supreme Court refuses to require that the standard of measurement
be proportioned to use with scientific accuracy, it necessarily recognizes
that the adjustment of the charges against an interstate operator to the
costs actually entailed by his use of the roads may be only approximate.
As a result, even though the charges imposed exceed the cost to the state,
they should be sustained as reasonable so long as they approximate it.
Another reason is that complexities of accounting and the prevalent non-
existence of much of the necessary evidence render it exceedingly difficult
for the operator to prove with any degree of certainty the actual cost
to the state from his use of the roads.4 3 If he should be able to show that
the tax imposed exceeded the cost to the state, the amount of the difference
necessary to make the tax unreasonable would largely depend upon the
legislative intent. If an intent to exact more than cost value of the use
made of the roads could be shown, no doubt a relatively small excess charge
would make the tax unreasonable. On the other hand, in the absence of a
legislative intent to make a profit, the excess charge would have to be
relatively large before the courts would feel that the discrepancy should
not be ignored.44 Beyond this it is impossible to generalize.
41. Intrastate operators may be required to pay a privilege tax in excess
of compensation to the state for use made; Carley & Hamilton v. Snook, 281
U. S. 66 (1930).
42. American Motor Coach System v. City of Philadelphia, mupra note 18,
where a fiat fee of $50 on all busses raised a total sum only slightly in excess
of total expenses of regulation without regard to cost of street maintenance.
43. See Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U. S. 245 (1928) and Clark
v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554 (1927) where the interstate operator made no effort to
prove the cost to the state entailed by his use. In Kane v. New Jersey, 242
U. S. 160 (1916) the interstate operator attempted to show that a vehicle regis-
tration fee was in excess of costs of regulation, but made no effort to show
that it was in excess of cost of regulation and use, to both of which purpose3
the proceeds of the tax were allocated. Due to the difficulty of proof, discrim-
ination is the most utilized ground for a claim of invalidity.




So far as the commerce clause alone is concerned, the question of dis-
crimination arises only where there is different treatment of interstate
and intrastate operators who are in the same class. 45 Where varying
standards of measurement are applied to interstate and intrastate opera-
tors otherwise in the same class, in order to sustain a claim of unjust
discrimination against interstate commerce, the interstate operator must
prove that in practical operation the intrastate standard of measurement
subjects the operator to a smaller tax burden than does the interstate
standard, and that the difference in the two burdens is substantial in
nature. It is not enough merely to show that there is a variance in the
standards of measurement.40 Nor would it suffice to show that in par-
ticular instances the two standards of measurement would give results
unfavorable to interstate commerce without showing that this would also
be true in the general run of cases for which taxation statutes are of
necessity devised. 47 The amount of the difference adverse to interstate
commerce necessary to sustain an allegation of unjust discrimination would,
as in the case of the amount of excess of charges over cost necessary to
constitute unreasonableness, largely depend upon the legislative intent.
45. Questions of discrimination under the 14th Amendment arise whore
carriers of particular products; Schwartzman Service v. Stahl, 60 F. (2d)
1034 (D. C. Mo. 1932) (farm and dairy products and newspapers); Smith v.
Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553 (1931) (farm and sea products); are exempted from
various types of regulation; or where different taxes are imposed upon differ-
ent types of carriers; Broadway Express v. Murray, supra note 22 (three
classes of carriers subjected to different tax rates), where the classification
does not have as a basis the distinction between interstate and intrastate com-
merce.
The exemption provision contained in KAN. LAws (1931) c. 236, § 2 sus-
tained in Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352 (1932) is typical:
"This act shall not apply to motor carriers who shall operate wholly within
any city or village of this state, or private motor carriers who operate within
a radius of twenty-five miles beyond the corporate limits of such city, or any
village, nor to the transportation of live stock and farm products to market
by the owner thereof or supplies for his own use in his own motor vehicle;
or to the transportation of children to and from school." The act there liti-
gated exacted taxes from and imposed insurance requirements, safety and sani-
tary regulations, etc. upon motor carriers whether in interstate or intrastate
commerce.
46. Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U. S. 245 (1928).
47. In speaking of the related question of discrimination under the Four-
teenth Amendment the Court said in General American Tank Car Corp, v. Day,
270 U. S. 367, 373 (1926) that: "where the statute imposing a tax which is
in lieu of a local tax assessed on residents, discloses no purpose to discriminate
against non-resident tax-payers, and in substance does not do so, it is not invalid
merely because equality in its operation as compared with local taxation has
not been attained with mathematical exactness. In determining whether there
is a denial of equal protection of the laws by such taxation, we must look to
the fairness and reasonableness of its purposes and practical operation, rather
than to minute differences between its application in practice and the appli-
cation of the taxing statute or statutes to which it is complementary."
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Where the same standard of measurement is applied to interstate and
intrastate operators alike, a claim of discrimination may arise where the
amount of the tax is not proportioned to use of the roads, but is the same
for the infrequent and frequent user so long as both are operating the
same number of similar vehicles in the same type of business. In such
a case the benefit to the infrequent user per dollar of taxes paid would be
materially less than the benefit to the frequent user. The only case directly
in point, decided by a statutory three-judge federal court, indicates that
the representative interstate operator, unlike the intrastate operator, is
an infrequent user.48 Apparently any interstate operator, whether a fre-
quent or infrequent user, may raise the claim of unjust discrimination
against interstate commerce, and if the claim is substantiated as to the
representative operator, then the tax is invalid as applied to interstate
commerce generally.49
If the representative operators are as indicated above, then there would
be discrimination against interstate commerce wherever the standard of
measurement was not proportioned to use of the roads. But whether or
not such discrimination is unconstitutional, should be determined, as the
question of when taxes must be proportioned to use so as not to be un-
reasonable, in the light of practical considerations. Where consideration
of factors such as the number of operators and the amount of taxes in-
volved indicates that the requirement of a standard of measurement relat-
ing to use would not be impracticable, the requirement that the repre-
sentative interstate and intrastate operators receive equal benefits per
dollar paid should be stressed. On the other hand, should consideration
of the material factors involved indicate that such a requirement would
be an undue burden on all concerned, then the requirement of equal yield
per tax dollar paid should be relegated to the background, so that the
tax, if reasonable, would be a valid burden on interstate commerce.O But
in any event the burden of proof is on the interstate operator to show
discrimination, and there are no presumptions in his favor.5 '
48. Prouty v. Coyne, supra note 21, at 293.
49. Ibid.
50. This was done in Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 168 (1916): "A
resident desiring to use the highways only a single day would also have to pay
the full annual fee." (italics ours). In such a case, then, the representative
operators make the same amount of use instead of the interstate representa-
tive being the infrequent and the intrastate representative being the frequent
user.
51. Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554 (1927). In view of Interstate Transit,
Incorporated v. Lindsey, 283 U. S. 183 (1931) and Sprout v. South Bend, 277
U. S. 163 (1928), it would seem that the only reason that the interstate operator
in Clark v. Poor lost his case was that he was so sure that the general regu-
lative scheme involved was invalid as applied to interstate commerce that he
took the case too lightly. But this appearance is not entirely correct, as the
Court has but gradually shifted to the view that the larger taxes must be
proportioned to use; the shift not having been completed until Sprout v. South
Bend was decided in 1928. In Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 108 (1916)
Mr. Justice Brandeis indicated that any compensating tax which was reason-
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Since the attitude of the courts would, or should, vary with the resultant
of all factors involved, it is difficult to generalize as to when a claim of
discrimination should be recognized and when it should be ignored. This
difficulty is enhanced by the dearth of authority directly in point. It may
safely be said, however, that as to taxes not proportioned to use, an inter-
state operator should be able to sustain a claim of discrimination in the
case of the larger extra taxes imposed for use of the roads for hire.62
But he should not be able to sustain a claim of discrimination in the case
of the smaller taxes and fees, where proportionment to use would entail
administrative expenses grossly out of proportion to the net revenue in-
tended to be raised by the tax. 3 As to the larger vehicle registration fees
imposed upon operators of vehicles of greater power, heavier weight, or
larger capacity, one lower federal court has required proportionment to
use.54 However, in view of the fact that because of reciprocity statutes
and general administrative policies, registration fees are not generally
exacted from operators not contemplating moderately extensive use, the
wisdom of forcing the states to extend the extensive administrative organ-
ization required by taxes proportioned to use to the field of vehicle regis-
tration fees is doubtful.55
FFECT OF PRIORITIES ALLOWED BY STATE STATUTES
IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
ALTHOUGH prior to the National Bankruptcy Act 1 all regulation of the
administration of insolvent estates was exercised by the states, its passage
has been held to suspend the state insolvency laws.2 But under section 64b a
dealing with priorities in the distribution of bankrupt estates, state in-
able in amount did not have to be proportioned to use. Yet the same Judge
speaking for the Court in the Sprout case held that such was no longer the
case. See (1929) 23 Iwi L. Ruv. 502.
52. The decision in Interstate Transit, Incorporated v. Lindsey, 283 U. S.
183 would doubtless have gone the same way though the preliminary showing
of a proper purpose had been made.
53. No one would contend that the $5 license fee charged users for hire in
State v. Public Service Commission, supra note 22 was discriminatory. The
interstate operator in Broadway Express v. Murray, supra note 22, did not
attack the $100 license fee required of it as a contract carrier, but instead
attacked the mileage tax.
54. Prouty v. Coyne, supra note 21. Since no mention was made of the
actual amount of the vehicle registration fees involved, the Court might have
had the notion that the Supreme Court will hereafter be so realistic as to
require proportionment to use of all compensatory taxes. But since the fees
involved were undoubtedly close ,to the upper limit of $400, the decision may
be restricted to a set of facts including the assumption that the fees charged
were closer to $400 than to $15 (the lower limit).
55. The Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction of the case and will
soon dispel the doubt. Coyne v. Prouty, 53 Sup. Ct. 6 (U. S. 1932).
1. 11 U. S. C. (1926).
2. See (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 603, at 604-606; (1929) 27 MiOH L. RBu. 696.
3. 11 U. S. C. § 104 (1926).
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solvency laws have been recognized as still in force to the emxtent that they
regulate priorities. 4 After enumerating certain classes of debts entitled
to priority, the section concludes: "(7) debts owing to any person G who by
the laws of the states or the United States is entitled to priority. . " 0
It is not clear, however, whether administration under the state insolvency
statute prior to the proceedings in bankruptcy is necessary in order to
entitle a creditor to priority under section 64b (7).7 If the state statute
does not provide for a particular mode of administration, but merely
indicates the order of distribution of an insolvent estate, it is probable that
prior state administration would not be essential.8
Today the more common state statutes dealing with insolvent estates, not
being so broad in their scope as to be general insolvency laws, are not
suspended by the Act. But administration under one of these statutes
may be suspended by bankruptcy. Thus, a valid assignment for the benefit
of creditors made under state law may be avoided by bankruptcy within
four months of the assignment.9 Although it has been strongly urged that
since the assignment is void as to the trustee, the state law should not
govern, the priorities applicable under the assignment statutes have been
4. In re Wright, 95 Fed. 807 (D. Mass. 1899); In re Worcester County, 102
Fed. 808 (C. C. A. 1st, 1900); In re Daniels, 110 Fed. 745 (D. R. I. 1901);
In re Western Implement Co., 166 Fed. 576 (D. Blinn. 1909).
5. Under the 1926 amendment 64b (7) concludes: "Provided, that the term
'person' as used in this section shall include corporations, the United States
and the several states and territories of the United States." Prior to 1926 it
had been held that "person" did not include the United States. Davis v. Pringle,
268 U. S. 315 (1925), rev'g Standard Oil Co. v. Miller, 3 F. (2d) 438 (C. C. A.
4th, 1925), af'g In re Atlantic G. & P. S. S. Co., 289 Fed. 145 (D. Md. 1923);
(1925) 9 MniN. L. Ruv. 376; see Colin, The Priority of the Uvited States in the
Payment of its Claims Against a Bankrupt (1924) 24.COL. L. REv. 30. In rO
Western Implement Co., 166 Fed. 576 (D. Minn. 1909), held a state a person
under the section, but In re C. 0. Pick Co., 9 F. (2d) 207 (D. Ore. 1925), held
the State Industrial Accident Fund not a person.
6. § 64b (7) in the present act was formerly § 64b (5) and where § b (7)
is referred to it will include § b (5) of the act prior to 1926.
7. In In re Jones, 151 Fed. 108 (W. D. Mich. 1907), the court refused to
grant a priority based on the state insolvency law in the absence of an action
under the statute. Administration under the statute was not usual in Michigan
and priority would not have been granted by the state courts. But in other
cases priorities have been allowed without an action. In re Goldberg Bros.,
144 Fed. 566 (D. Me. 1906); In re Iroquois Machinery Co., 166 Fed. 629 (D. R. I.
1909) (costs of attachment granted preference although no insolvency law at
time of attachment and no assignment which would have brought it under
another statute). When different priorities were granted under different forms
of administration, difficulty would arise.
8. 6 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (3d ed. 1923) § 2848.
9. Under § 3a (5), 11 U. S. C. § 21 (1926) an assignment for the benefit
of creditors is an act of bankruptcy. For cases where an assignment has been
superseded by bankruptcy, see In re Bryant, 104 Fed. 789 (E. D. Tenn. 1900);
Wilber v. Watson, 111 Fed. 493 (D. R. I. 1901); In e Lewis Neurburger Inc.,
240 Fed. 947 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
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applied even when the assignment itself has been set aside.10 Similarly,
when a state receivership under a statute granting priorities to certain
classeg of debts is superseded by bankruptcy," the priorities will be al-
lowed.12 But it is not certain that priority will be granted under section
64b (7), either after an assignment or receivership, to claims such as
receiver's and assignee's fees and costs for which priority may not be
specifically provided by the state statute.13
Where the priority urged is for costs incurred in an attachment suit
which has been set aside by the bankruptcy court, the majority of cases
have allowed the costs of a bona fide suit if they were granted priority
by the state law.14  On the other hand, it has been held that the costs of
such a proceeding does not constitute a debt and so cannot come under
section 64b (7).15 Moreover, it is urged that an attachment, unlike a re-
ceivership or assignment for the benefit of creditors, is not for the
preservation of the estate but solely to gain a preference which is contrary
to the policy of the Act. The preference being avoided, it is argued that
the same policy would prevent the costs being granted a priority. 0 An
analogy may be drawn to costs incurred by an assignee or his attorney in
drawing assignment papers, or in opposing bankruptcy, such a claim being
denied a preference 17 although it would have been preferred in admin-
istration under the assignment.
The priority granted a class of debts by state law appears to be en-
forceable under section 64b (7) only in the absence of definite provision
for such debts in other sections of the act.' 8 Thus, since section 64b (5)
reads: "Wages due to workmen, clerks, traveling or city salesmen, or
servants, which have been earned within three months before the date of
10. In re Goldberg, supra note 7. Contra: In re Slomka, 122 Fed. 360
(C. C. A. 2d, 1903).
11. § 3 a (6), 11 U. S. C. § 21 (1926) makes the appointment of a receiver
while a debtor is insolvent an act of bankruptcy. See Bank of Andrews v.
Grudger, 212 Fed. 49 (C. C. A. 4th, 1914) and cases cited (1932) 41 YAM L. J.
1234.
12. Such statutes will be enforced under § 64b (7) unless the claims granted
priority are otherwise provided for by the Act as explained infra.
13. See (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1234, 1236.
14. In re Iroquois Machinery Co., supra note 7; In ro Amoratis, 178 Fed.
919 (C. C. A. 9th, 1910); In re Nickolson, 13 F. (2d) 55 (D. R. I. 1026). Costs
of a suit have been allowed a priority. In re Daniels, supra note 6. Fees of a
sheriff making the attachment have been allowed priority. In ro Lewis, 99 Fed.
935 (D. Mass. 1900). Contra: In re Whittey, 2 F. (2d) 889 (W. D. Tenn.
1924) (levy on real estate and bankruptcy before sale).
15. In re The Copper King, 143 Fed. 649 (N. D. Cal. 1906).
16. Wisong v. Clarke, 285 Fed. 726 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922) (Action to create
a lien that was avoided by bankruptcy),
17. Randolph v. Scruggs, 190 U. S. 533 (1903).
18. 6 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTOY § 2855 and cases cited. States may not
vary the order of payment provided by the Act. In re MeDavid Lumber Co.,
190 Fed. 97 (N. D. Fla. 1911); or postpone a claim, Barks v. Kleyne, 15 F. (2d)
153 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) (fraudulent conveyance set aside, but the court refused
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the commencement of the proceedings, not in excess of $600 to each
claimant," 39 it has been held exclusive as to priorities of wage claims
against the bankrupt estate,20 even to the extent of precluding priorities
granted to a class of employees not covered by the Act.2  Thus, in the
early ease In re Rouse, Hazard Co., 2 2 it was held that section 64b (5) was
exclusive as to wage claims. Later decisions have seemed to disregard this
holding to some extent, although it is probable that it Will still be followed.
In Emeison v. Caster 2 the court refused to decide whether section 64b (5)
or the state law under section 64b (7) should control since the amount of
priority would have been the same in either event. Subsequently, in In
re Western Condensed Mi.l Co.,2-4 priority under section 64b (7) was
granted wage claims accruing more than three months before bankruptcy,
the Supreme Court denying certiorari. It was admitted that the cases were
not in accord, but no attempt was made to distinguish adverse holdings,
and in fact none were cited. The court relied to some extent on In re
Laird,25 a case involving a lien perfected under the state statute and there-
fore clearly distinguishable. The court could have avoided conflict with
the earlier cases holding section 64b (5) exclusive, by reasoning, as was
done in later cases,2 6 that the three months' limit in the Bankruptcy Act
dated from the inception of administration under the state law rather than
from the time of filing the petition in bankruptcy. This would have
achieved the desired result, since the state statute limited priority to wages
earned within ninety days of the insolvency proceedings (in this case
a state receivership) to the extent of $100 for each claim. Such reasoning,
however, cannot avoid the conflict where the amount allowable as a priority
to each claim under the state statute is greater than that permitted by
section 64b (5), or where priority is given to wages earned more than
three months before insolvency proceedings. Moreover it is not clear that
"proceedings" as used in 64b (5) is meant to include proceedings other
than bankruptcy. The most recent decisions on the point do not follow
the Western Condensed Milk case. -
to follow the state statute postponing share of one guilty of fraud until all
creditors were paid). But as to claims under section 64b (7), states may
fix the order of payment. See In re Falls City Shirt Mlfg. Co., 98 Fed. 592,
594 (D. Ky. 1898).
19. Allowances for each claimant were limited to $300 before the amendment
of 1926. 11 U. S. C. § 104 (1926).
20. In re Crown Point Brush Co., 200 Fed. 882 (N. D. N. Y. 1912) and
cases cited infra notes 22, and 27.
21. Cf. Haines v. Keating, 296 Fed. 896 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1924); In ro Crawford
Wallen Co., 218 Fed. 95 (W. D. Va. 1915).
22. 91 Fed. 96 (C. C. A. 7th, 1899).
23. 236 Fed. 29 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916).
24. 261 Fed. 62 (C. C. A. 6th, 1919), cart. dem, 251 U. S. 560 (1920).
25. 109 Fed. 550 (C. C. A. 6th, 1901).
26. In re Rodgers & Garrett Timber Co., 22 F. (2d) 571 (D. Md. 1927);
Manly v. Hood, 37 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
27. In re Seattle Cut Glass Co., 1 F. (2d) 409 (W. D. Wash. 1923); In ro
Rodgers & Garrett Timber Co., supra note 26.
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It has been held that section 64b has no application to liens "8- as they
are covered by section 67 of the Act.2D It is possible, therefore, that in
those states granting wage claimants a lien against an insolvent estate,
wage claims will receive a greater preference than provided under section
64b (5). It seems clear that a lien for wages perfected and not avoidable
under section 67 should be enforced as to wage claims outside the three
months period.30 As to wages within the three months' period, the cases
seem to indicate that section 64b (5) is exclusive, for although there is
some authority for allowing a lien for wages earned in that period,8 1 there
is serious doubt that these cases will be followed.3 2
Another problem closely associated with that of wage claims is created
by statutes granting priority to -awards of workmen's compensation and
compensation insurance premiums. Difficulty in this connection is largely
due to the unfortunate wording of statutes, which state that the same
prioi'ity shall be granted as is accorded wage claims. As a result, courts
are again presented with the confusing conflict betveen wage priorities
under section 64b (5) and section 64b (7). For example, in a case
involving workman's compensation premiums under a Wisconsin statute 
8 3
the bankruptcy court refused to commit itself upon the conflict between
the state assignment statute allowing proof of labor claims accruing with
six months of the assignment and section 64b (5), which would limit the
claims to those accruing within three months of the "proceedings"; 04 the
court contented itself with the statement that a preference cannot be given
for a claim that arose more than six months prior to the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy.3 5 An earlier district court decision involving the
same statute held that while a state statute could not enlarge the scope of
section 64b (5), the claim could be brought under section 64b (7),80 and
consequently would not be subject to the $300 limit then provided in
64b (5). Under the New York statute 37 which also allows compensation
28. Bird v. City of Richmond, 240 Fed. 545 (C. C. A. 4th, 1917). See (1910)
9 Micn. L. Rzv. 146; Hogan, Priorities Versus Liens in Bankruptcy (1914)
78 CENT. L. J. 313.
29. 11 U. S. C. § 107 (1926).
30. See In re Cramond, 145 Fed. 966, 979 (N. D. N. Y. 1906).
31. In re Laird, supra note 25; Spears v. Akers, 31 F. (2d) 750 (C. C. A.
6th, 1929).
32. See In re Slomka, supra note 10. The confusion of courts in distinguishing
between a lien and priority will probably result in the consideration of both
classes under § 64b as governed by § 64b (5).
33. Wis. STAT. (1929) c. 102, § 28.
34. In re William H. Deason & Co., 19 F. (2d) 275 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927).
35. Id. at 277. This does not seem an application of either statute but a
compromise.
36. In re Inglis Mfg. Co., 292 Fed. 907 (E. D. Wis. 1923) (disapproved in
the Deason case, supra note 34, at 277.
37. N. Y. CoNsoL. LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 66, § 34.
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the same status as is provided for wage claims, an employee who had been
injured before bankruptcy and whose compensation had not been fully
paid, was denied priority on the ground that wages were granted priority
only under the state assignment statute, and there had been no assignment
in that case.38 The result seems unfortunate in the light of section 64b (7)
and the extent to which other bankruptcy courts have gone in allowing
priorities regardless of the lack of prior state administration. In Oregon
the state set up an Industrial Accident Fund to which employers paid
a percentage of their payroll. 39 These payments were made a preferred
claim in insolvency proceedings and in bankruptcy.40 One bankruptcy court
allowed the priority,41 but in the same year a different court refused to
grant the payments priority on the ground that the fund was not a 'person"
under section 64b (7).42 Under some statutes the claims for premiums are
granted a lien rather than a priority and so do not come under section
64b. s But in two cases defects in filing of liens have been held to prevent
priority of any sort.44 More carefully worded statutes granting priority to
awards of workmen's compensation and compensation insurance premiums
without reference to wage claims and made expressly applicable to the case
of bankruptcy, would assure recognition under section 64b (7).45
Preferences will be allowed landlords for rent within the limits granted
by state statutes 46 even where common law distraint is still available.4 T
In many jurisdictions the statute creates a lien,48 but bankruptcy courts
have on occasion considered these statutes as giving no greater rights than
those which merely grant a priority,49 and both types of statute may be
38. Lane v. Industrial Commission of the State of N. Y., 54 F. (2d) 338
(C. C. A. 2d, 1931); (1932) 32 Co,. L. Rnv. 531. Cf. In ro Slomka, supra note
10. The.court failed to cite the New York receivership statute providing for
priority for later claims. N. Y. CoNsoi,. LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 24, §§ 180, 181.
39. 3 ORE. COD- ANi. (1930) § 49-1825.
40. Id., § 49-1830.
41. In re Ireland, 4 F. (2d) 813 (S. D. Cal. 1925).
42. In re C. 0. Pick Co., supra note 4 (decided on the authority of the
Pringle case, supra note 4, also handed down that year).
43. For a collection of provisions, see 2 SCHNEmER, WoRr.EN's Co.Ln--
SATION (1922) § 570 note 1. Cf. In re Lexie Mining Co., 1 F. (2d) 344 (W. D.
Pa. 1923) (held to be a secret lien that would not be enforced).
44. In re C. A. Taylor Logging & Lumber Co., 28 F. (2d) 526 (W. D. Wash.
1928); In re Unit Lock Co., 49 F. (2d) 313 (N. D. Okla. 1931).
45. See Note (1932) 41 YAIm L. J. 776 as to provability of such claims in
bankruptcy without regard to priority.
46. In re Southern Co., 180 Fed. 838 (D. Ind. 1904); In re Chandron, 180
Fed. 841 (D. Ind. 1904).
47. A landlord's lien is not one that can be set aside as a preference under
§ 67 and if the landlord has distrained he may keep the proceeds of sale. Bird
v. City of Richmond, supra note 28.
48. See REmINGTON, BANxRuPTCY ((3d ed. 1923) § 2856 for the cases under
various state laws.
49. In re Brinson, 1 F. (2d) 824 (S. D. Fla. 1924) (priority granted under
statute providing for lien).
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considered together. It is generally held that priority will not be accorded
rent accruing after adjudication,50 although a statutory provision allowing
a lien for a limited amount of future rent has been enforced in bankruptcy,61
and where the parties contract for a lien to protect future rents, it will be
enforced.5 2 As the priority is strictly limited to rents, water rents due
a city 63 and costs incurred in discharging a mechanic's lien 64 may not
be granted a priority. If, however, the parties contract to include taxes
and insurance premiums as part of the rent, these charges will be included
in granting priority.55 Priority is granted on the theory that a landlord
should be compensated for the loss of his right to distrain. Consequently
priority will not be allowed rent accruing under a lease to a tenant who
has given up the premises to a new occupant, no goods of the first
tenant being subject to distress in that situation.60 As in the case of
priorities granted claims under Workman's Compensation Laws, the prob-
lem is primarily one of statutory phrasing and construction.
Other classes of claims which have been alloWed priority under section
64b (7) include cost of convict labor,57 debts owed by a guardian to a
ward,58 freight charges incurred while the railroads were under govern-
ment control,59 labor and materialmen's claims in the logging industry,00
debts owed from community property,0 1 labor and materialmen's claims
against mining and manufacturing corporations,0 2 and double liability on
bank stock.03
50. See (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 894.
51. See Goodman, Rent as a Priority Claim in Bankruptcy In Virginia
(1916) 3 VA. L. REv. 366. Courtney v. Fidelity Trust Co., 219 Fed. 57 (C. C. A.
6th, 1914). Contra: In re Jefferson, 93 Fed. 948 (D. Ky. 1899).
52. In re Homann, 45 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930) (deposit for rent).
53. In re Family Laundry Co., 193 Fed. 297 (E. D. Pa. 1912).
54. In re Schomacker Piano Forte Mfg. Co., 163 Fed. 413 (E. D. Pa. 1908)
(repairs done under order of the board of health where the lease provided for
repairs by the tenant).
55. In re Spies-Alper Co., 231 Fed. 535 (D. N. J. 1916); of. In ro Tri-State
Theatres Corp., 296 Fed. 246 (E. D. Pa. 1923).
56. In re West, 253 Fed. 963 (E. D. Pa. 1918).
57. In re Western Implement Co., supra note 4; In re Worcester County,
supra note 6.
58. In re Crow, 116 Fed. 110 (W. D. Ky. 1902).
59. In re Stork Contractors' Export Co., 285 Fed. 438 (S. D. Fla. 1922) ; of.
In re Atlantic G. & P. S. S. Co., supra note 4, aff'd, Standard Oil Co. v. Miller,
supra note 4; Re Tidewater Coal Exchange, supra note 4.
60. In re Rodgers & Garrett Timber Co., supra note 26.
61. In re Chavez, 149 Fed. 73 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906).
62. In re J. Rheinstrom & Sons, 207 Fed. 119 (E. D. Ky. 1913), aff'd, Central
Trust Co. v. George Lueders & Co., 221 Fed. 829 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915) cort. don.,
238 U. S. 634 (1915), appeal dismissed, 239 U. S. 11 (1915); of. Louisville
Woolen Mills v. Johnson, 228 Fed. 606 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916) cort. den., 241 U. S.
665 (1916).
63. Wheeler v. Johnson, 26 F. (2d) 455 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
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The constitutional limits within which a state must keep in providing
for priorities that will be enforced under section 64b (7) is indicated by
a recent decision,0 which held a Tennessee statute giving residents a
priority over foreign corporations in the distribution of insolvent estates
unconstitutional under the 1926 amendment to section 64b (7),G5 although
prior thereto the validity of the statute had been upheldc
PROFIT SHARING FOR EXECUTIVES AN]D EMPLOYEES-
THE AMEIBICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, A CASE IN POINT
PROFIT sharing for laborers and executives has been heralded as an in-
dustrial program which retains the essential capitalistic feature of
production for profit, and at the same time minimizes the unequal
distribution of wealth and the evils of absentee ownership.' The share
of each individual in the portion of profits allocated to his group is generally
measured by his fixed wage, the index of the value of his services. The
distribution of profits is made in the form of periodic payments of cash
or stock, or in the opportunity to purchase stock at advantageous prices.
If to the workingman's share of profits, a voice in management of the
enterprise *ere added, the implications of the "new capitalism" prophesy
a society of industrial harmony and economic prosperity.2 But the happy
64. In re C. D. Hauger Co., 54 F. (2d) 117 (N. D. Tex. 1931). The reasoning
in this case does not seem conclusive. See Robinson, The Scope and Effect of the
1926 Amendment to the Bankruptcy Act (1926) 12 ConN. L. Q. 48, at 54.
65. See note 5, supra.
66. In re Standard Oak Veneer Co., 173 Fed. 103 (E. D. Tenn. 1909) (held
unconstitutional as to citizens of other states but valid as to foreign corpora-
tions).
1. The literature is extensive and sometimes inspired. See CAIrM, Tim
PRESENT ECON0auIC REvoLuTIox IN THE UNrm STATES (1925); Profit Sharing
in the United States (1917) U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Whole no. 203
(1917); NATIONAL CIVIC FEDERATION REPORT ON PROFrIr SHARING BY A2,IEnICAN
EMPLoYERs (1921); NATIONAL INDUsTRIAL CONFRmNCE BOARD, ELIPLOYED STOCI
PURcHAsE PLANs (1928) and supplement EniPLa, O STOCK Puncisn Pis
AND STOCK A4RKET CRASH (1930); FosEsTmR AND DIETEL, EMPLOYEE STOCm
OWNERSHIP IN THE UNITE STATES (1928); BALDERSTON, MANAGERL PnorTr
SHARING (1928); CO moNS, INDUSTRIAL GovEwmnNT (1921); BLmuI .,
FINANcIAL INCENTIVES FOR EMPLOYEES AND EXECUTIVES (1923) where an ade-
quate index to periodical literature is given. For English experience see BansH
MINISTRY OF LABOR, REPORT ON PROFIT SHARING (1920), and an excellent study
BowI, SHARING PROFITs WITH EMPLOYEES (1922). For France, see LAGuEam,
SocIfTts ANONYmES I PARTiCIPATiON OUVIPE (1920).
2. Magruder, Labor Copartnership in Industry (1922) 35 HIMv. L. Ruv. 910.
A journalistic specimen is Nelson, Le Claire-An Existing City of the Future,
(1914) 77 INDEPENDENT 100. The Columbia Conserve Co. and Maison Le Claire
in France are notable examples of such a developmefit. For an interes-ting
example of philanthropic attempt of an owner to give employees control by
testamentary trust see Hoglan v. Moore, 219 Ala. 497, 122 So. 824 (1927); but
ef. Nichols v. Olympia Veneer Co., infra, note 14.
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promises of profit sharing to laborers are at present far from realization.
Although short-lived experiments in profit sharing in the United States
date as early as 1870, the period of greatest expansion occurred in the
five years of 1921-1925, when about 250 companies initiated their plans.
Still, less than 3% of the total number of wage earners have been allowed
to participate in profit sharing. The average addition to the fixed wage
is a 10% increase, and the average life of a plan is no more than nine
years.8 To its proponents, the most disappointing fact in the history of
profit sharing is the failure of the rank and file laborers to respond to
the opportunity of sharing in profits.4 In fact organized labor, both here
and abroad, has bluntly opposed the introduction of profit sharing on the
grounds that the interest of labor lies in a secure and decent fixed wage,
and that profit sharing induces a loyalty to each enterprise and thereby
obstructs general trade organization.5 Actually, the adoption of profit
sharing for laborers has in the main depended upon the convincing appeal
it may be able to make to the employer as a solution of modern labor
problems, and not the least element of persuasion has been the hope that
employees can be dissuaded from a militant self-interested organization.
0
Extensive adoption has come in periods of industrial unrest and increasing
profits.7. Uniformly, the employer has retained the right to discontinue
the participation of the employees in profits. In short, profit sharing In
the form of bonuses or stock purchase plans has neither furnished the
3. These statistical trends are noted in the more objective studies cited
above.
4. Bowm, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 90. NATIONAL Civic FEDERATION REPORT,
op. cit. supra note 1 at pp. 6-8. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CONFERENOD
BOARD, PROFIT SHARING (1920) p. 28.
5. See Sullivan, Objections to Profit Sharing, pp. 110-135, Nat'l Civic Feder-
ation Report on Profit Sharing (1921). PEASE, PROFIT SHARING AND CO-
PARTNERSHIP (1913). Fabian Tract No. 170 (1913). (1926) 33 AmERIOAN
FEDERATIONIST, II, p. 1191. That the interest of labor lies in a decent fixed
wage is supported to some extent by the fact that the chief successes of
profit sharing have come in stabilized enterprises supplying a constant demand
where profits are certain. See cases of Boston Gas Co. (Civic FEDERATION
REPORT, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 38) and of So. Metropolitan Gas Company in
England. British Ministry of Labor op. cit. supra note 1, at pp. 47 to 54. The
objection of organized labor have been met by declarations that unions could
be based on co-operation with employers rather than present day antagonism.
See BowiE, op. cit. supra note 1, ch. XIV; CARPENTER, INDUSTRIAL Co-PARTNER-
SHIP (1921).
6. "Profit sharing plans now in use have been introduced . . . mainly with
the idea of securing the co-operation and loyalty of the working force."
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE, BOARD, REPORT ON PROFIT SHARING (1920)
p. 6. This body is an association of employers organizations. One firm reported
the fact that its employees remained at work during a strike as justification
for the plan. See Civic FEDERATION REPORT (1921) at p. 63; See also U. S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 9; BowID, op. cit. supra
note 1 pp. 60-68.
7. British Ministry of Labor Report, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 10, U. S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, op. cit. supra note 1.
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workingman with an appreciable increase in his portion of wealth 8 nor
endowed him with any substantial legal rights. The executive, however,
by exerting the pressure of his superior bargaining power through bonus
schemes and stock participation, has gained both advantages.0 Significantly,
the fact that there is but one case10 in which an employee tried to
assert rights under a scheme of stock participation is evidence of the one-
sided and arbitrary manner in which profit sharing is adopted. There
the Standard Oil Company of Indiana had set up a stock purchase with the
usual arrangement for instalment payments over a period of years, to
be supplemented by contributions from the company. Full ownership of
the stock by the employee, which realized the compaiy's contribution of
one half of the purchase price, depended upon continued employment. A
mechanic, employed by the week, who was discharged three months before
the period terminated, could not compel his employer to show cause for
his discharge and hAd to content himself with the return of his own
payments plus interest. -Nor, in another instance, did a novel "labor co-
partnership" fare better as against the right of a non-active shareholder.
There a group of workingmen formed a corporate enterprise, and attempted
to distribute the profits in the form of high wages to themselves. The
court in a suit brought by the widow of one of the founders, considering
those wages unreasonable and in reality a distribution of profits, reduced
them and allowed the plaintiff to share in the increased earnings."
The cases reflect the superior bargaining power of executives. Although
directors will be held to good faith towards stockholders in determining
8. Case of Boston Gas Co. is representative of successful operation. In the
period from 1908-1919, the average money wage ranged from $850 to $1344 and
bonuses were 7% to 8% thereof realizing each worker $69 to $94. Cmc FED.
REPORT (1921) p. 36. NAT'L INDUsTRiAL CoNr. BoAmm. EmPLOYE Srocx
PURCHASE PLANs (1928) p. 35.
9. It is of course difficult to define executive class. Perhaps a valid definition
would be: one who is in a position to direct efforts of others in the enterprise.
For a brief competent study of theory of profit sharing for executives see Taussig
& Barker, American Corporations and Executives (1925) 40 Qu. JoURN. Eco. 1.
10. Larkin v. Stewart, 248 Ill. App. 152 (1928). of. Willson, Democracy in
Industry, The Industrial Relations Plan of the Standard Oil Company (1923)
Om. AND GAs J., Dec. 27, 1923. According to Willson, the Company's policy
provided that employees could not be discharged save for second violation of
one of 16 reasons and lists of these causes were prominently posted. Cf.
Day-Elders Motor Corp. v. Hexter, 92 N. J. Eq. 258, 110 AtU. 591 (1920) where
sales manager successfully contested right of employer to discharge him without
reasonable cause and gained the allotment of stock agreed upon. See note 15,
infra.
11. Nichols v. Olympia Veneer Co., 139 Wash. 305, 246 Pac. 941 (1926).
The wages of stockholding employees had been raised to $8 a day. The average
wage was $4. The court ruled $6 as proper and awarded the non-active
stockholder $2 a day for the working days since increase to entry of judgment,
over a year. See Scott v. P. Lorillard Co., 108 N. 3. Eq. 153, 154 AUt. 515




the amount of compensation for corporate executives, an otherwise proper
contract, driving a good bargain, will be enforced. 12 Bonus payments,
measured by worth of services and varying with profits, are legal modes of
compensation, provided an agreement is made to that effect beforehand. 10
Likewise, contracts are valid whereby a corporation agrees to repurchase
its own stock should the employee decide to withdraw from a stock pur-
chase plan.14 As against the stockholders' interest in profits, the courts
have held that compensation, contingent in amount upQn net earnings, is
a cost of the enterprise and not a distribution of funds usually allocated
to shareholders, although the plans themselves stipulate a deduction for
dividends before payment of the bonus.15
The executive has augmented his bargaining power by his control over
management.16 Although when the executive is a director as well,17 a higher
standard of fiduciary responsibility is imposed, yet despite these restraints,
such executives can obtain a substantial portion of the profits for themselves.
12. In re Knox Automobile Co., 229 Fed. 241 (D. Mass. 1915). Treasurer
on threat of leaving obtained salary increase from $12,000 to $25,000 and
allotment of stock. Although company went insolvent the next year, creditors
could not set aside the claim. Michigan Crown Fender Co. v. Welch, 211 Mich.
148, 178 N. W. 684 (1920) employee dismissed for disloyalty nontheless entitled
to block of stock promised as condition of accepting employment; Day-Elders-
Motor Corp. v. Hexter, supra note 12; Young v. U. S. M'tge and Trust Co., 214
N. Y. 279, 108 N. E. 418 (1915). Cf. Larkin v. Stewart, note 13, infra.
13. Church v. Harnit, 35 F. (2d) 499. (C. C. A. 6th, 1929); Ransomo
Concrete Machinery Co. v. Moody, 282 Fed. 29 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922), Putnam v.
Juvenile Shoe Co., 307 Mo. 74, 269 S. W. 593 (1925); Bennett v. Milvillo
Improvement Co., 67 N. J. L. 320, 51 Atl. 706 (1902); Young v. U. S. M'tgo &
Trust Co., 214 N. Y. 279, 108 N. E. 418 (1915); Note (1926) 40 A. L. It.
1423n. See also Dowd, Bonuses for Corporate Officials (1918) 86 C.NT. L. J.
208.
14. R & F Products Co. v. Rosenthal, 153 Md. 501, 138 AtI. 665 (1927); Reith
v. University Housing Corp., 247 Mich. 105, 225 N. W. 528 (1929); Chapman
v. Ironclad Rheostat Co., 62 N. J. L. 497, 41 Atl. 690 (1898) ; Koch v. Val Verde
Mercantile Corp., 4 S. W. (2d) 662 (Tex. 1928). Ten states have statutes
setting up machinery for employee stock purchase plans. California, Colorado,
Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio and
Pennsylvania. For summary see Fordham, Some Legal Aspects of Employoo
Stock Purchase Plans (1930) 8 N. C. L. Ruv. 161.
15. See cases infra note 16; and Fraker v. Hyde & Sons, 135 App. Div. 64,
119 N. Y. Supp. 879 (1st Dep't 1909) where such stipulation held not a condition
precedent to right of executive to recover his share.
16. The proponents of profit participation for laborers maintain that its
present shortcomings would be remedied were its beneficiaries allowed to
participate in management. Supra note 2.
17. The relationship may also exist between majority and minority stock-
holders. Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N. Y. 157, 61 N. E. 163 (1901); BALLANTINE),
CORPORATIONS (1930) 6: "The concentrated management and control of the
corporate form promote efficiency, but also create the possibility of abuse of
power." See especially Berle, Corporate Powers as powers in Trust (1930)
44 HARv. L. REv. 1049.
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The experience of the American Tobacco Company with a bonus plan and
with a stock purchase plan affords an illuminating example. In 1912,
the then directors of the corporation proposed a bonus plan which was
ratified by the stockholders at their annual meeting. The plan provided
that in each year 10% of the surplus of net profits over the net profits
of 1910 would be distributed in shares of two and one half percent to
the president and one and one half percent to each of the five vice-presi-
dents. In 1910 the net earnings were $8,222,248.42. In 1930, the net
earnings were $43,345,370, and that year the president received a bonus
of $840,000 in addition to a fixed salary of $168,000 and "special cash
credits" of $270,000. Payments to vice-presidents totalled $1,830,000, in
addition to salaries and "credits" of $700,000.
The court refused to grant a temporary injunction restraining further
payments at the instance of a minority stockholder seeking to recover
the excess above a reasonable compensation from the recipients. It based
its decision on the grounds that the distribution was a payment of com-
pensation; that compensation out of profits is legal; and that the precise
amount was a matter within the discretion of the majority stockholders. 8
By treating the matter as a question of a contract between the few directors
as executives on the one hand, and the scattered majority stockholders on
the other, the opinion assumes an equality of bargaining power between
the two that is inconsistent with the fiduciary relation which directors
occupy towards stockholders. Although the first two grounds advanced
by the court are already well supported,19 they are nevertheless, open to
question since they obscure the fact that profit participation directly taps
the funds hitherto allocated to stockholders. A more serious objection,
however, can be made to the refusal of the court to investigate the reason-
ableness of the sums realized by the directors as compensation. Here the
court has less support in previous cases. When directors vote themselves
compensation, the act is voidable at the instance of majority stockholders,
and the directors have the burden of proving reasonableness. Once the
act is ratified by the majority, the burden is thrown upon the dissenting
stockholders.2 0 Where the executives are themselves the majority stock-
holders, the courts have frequently reduced excessive compensation, especially
18. Rogers v. Hill, 60 F. (2d) 109 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), reversing decree
below. Judge Swan dissented vigorously, maintaining that even if it were not
a distribution of profits, the sums named were unreasonable. The Supreme
Court has granted writ of certiorari in this and the second case, below.
19. Supra note 13 and 15.
20. Seitz v. Union Brass & Metal Co., 152 AMinn 460, 189 N. W. 586
(1922); Lillard v. Oil Paint etc. Co., 70 N. X. Eq. 197, 56 Atl. 254 (1903);
Carr v. Kimball, 153 App. Div. 825, 139 N. Y. Supp. 253 (1st Dep't 1912); Sotter
v. Coatesville Boiler Works, 257 Pa. 411, 101 Atl. 744 (1917). BAIINTINW,
CoRPoRATIoNs (1930) 410. Note (1923) 7 MiN. L. REv. 347. Putnam v.
Juvenile Shoe Co., supra note 16, is indefinite and makes legality of bonus
scheme depend on its beneficial reshlts. Sotter v. Coatesville Boiler Works,
257 Pa. 411, 101 Atl. 744 (1917) lays down general rule of reasonableness.
See DowD, op. cit. supra note 13.
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if the dominant stockholders, actively engaged in the business, are trans-
parently seeking to increase their share of profits as against non-active
shareholders.21  But even where, as in the instant case, the numerical
majority of shares is not held by the directors, the presence of their self-
interest justifies the demand that they show the reasonableness of the
sums voted them. 22 It cannot be said that an inquiry into reasonableness
would impair the freedom of action necessary to efficient corporate manage-
ment by directors, since the compensation here is fixed by operation of a
by-law which removes discretion from the directors.28 Furthermore, the
courts may well admit the desirability of profit sharing by executives,
since executive enterprise is responsible for part of the gain in net earn-
ings.24 But the reward should be proportionate to the ability of the
executive, the difficulty of the position, and the success achieved. In
evaluating these factors, the court may compare the present reward of
the executive with previous compensation,25 and with the rewards of
executives in similar capacities in other enterprises. 20
The directors of the American Tobacco Company were able to extract
the major benefits from an employees' stock purchase plan as well as from
the bonus. The general tendency of such plans, even when designed for
21. Most of the rules on rights of minority stockholders to defeat excessive
salaries come out of litigation involving small closed corporations where the
directors are the majority stockholders as well. Heublein v. Wright, 227 Fed.
667 (D. C. Md. 1915) (3 stockholders, 2 brothers); Miller v. Crown Perfumery
Co., 57 Misc. 383, 109 N. Y. Supp. 760. (1908) (3 stockholders, one holding
controlling interest); McKey v. Swenson, 232 Mich. 305, 205 N. W. 583 (1925)
(3 directors constitute principal shareholders); Booth v. Beattie, 95 N. J. Eq.
777, 118 Atl. 257 (1923) (family corporation, nonactive women shareholders
objecting); But of. Shera v. Carbon Steel Co. 245 Fed. 589 (S. D. W. Va. 1917)
(large corporation directors controlling majority stock).
22. Certainly, the reasonableness of the sum fixed is psychologically com-
pelling. Extended arguments were made in court in the principal case by
counsel for Am. Tobacco Co. to show the reasonableness of the sums. Seo
Brief and Transcript of Record on Appeal. Note opinion in Putnam v. Juvenile
Show Co., supra note 13.
23. See Judge Swan's dissent. The New Jersey courts have raised doubts
concerning power of majority stockholders to fix compensation for employees.
See Scott v. P. Lorillard, supra note 11; Lillard v. Oil Paint & Drug Co., supra
note 20.
24. The respective roles of Lucky Strike Advertising and the post war
reaction in inducing women to smoke cigarettes is purely speculative.
25. This was used with effect in Heublein v. Wright, 227 Fed. 667 (D. 0.
Md. 1915); Sotter v. Coatesville Boiler Works, 257 Pa. 411, 101 Atl. 744 (1917);
Lillard v. Oil Paint & Drug Co., supra note 24, and Shera v. Carbon Steel Co.,
supra note 25. Berendt v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 108 N. J. Eq. 148, 154 Atl. 321
(1931).
26. Cf. Nichols v. Olympia Veneer Co., supra note 14. The technique for
measuring services is admittedly inadequate. See Balderston, op. cit. supra
note 1, ch. IV.
all employees, to concentrate the benefits in the executive class,27 was
exaggerated in this particular instance by the dominant part the executives
took as directors in formulating the plan.28 The New Jersey statute
provides a machinery whereby stockholders' preemptive rights may be
waived for the benefit of employees, who wish to purchase new issues of
stock on especially favorable terms.2 9 After two-thirds of the stockholders
had assented to a general plan, the directors allotted the major portion
of the shares to themselves and, incidentally, to the lawyers who drafted
the plan. The par value and purchase price of the shares was fixed at
twenty-five dollars payable from dividends accruing thereon to the re-
cipients as beneficiaries of a transfer by trust. The market value was
$116. In a suit by a minority stockholder to set aside the plan, the
court ignored the essence of the plan as compensation, refused to consider
whether the sums realized as shares were reasonable, and declared that
the plan was legally adopted by agreement between directors and majority
stockholders pursuant to the state statute.0 Apart from the unreasonable-
ness of the compensation, had a hikher standard of fiduciary responsibility
been enforced, there would have been ample justification for a finding of
bad faith and an order compelling the directors to resubmit a detailed
plan to the stockholders.31
As instances of executive profit sharing, these two cases throw into
relief the contrasting status of general employee participation in profits.
Although the decisions may commend themselves as recognition of executive
enterprise, they hardly aid the fulfillment of the promises of profit-sharing
advocates to alleviate the evils attendant upon unequal distribution of
wealth in a profit economy.32 Admittedly, the general acceptance of profit
sharing by workingmen depends upon economic and legislative develop-
ments. Criticism of the two cases, one involving the Standard Oil stock
27. Of stock purchase plans: "one of the outstanding conditions met with
in the previous study was the tendency either for management to sell originally
only to a selected group of employees or for an originally large group gradually
to become a select group . . ." SUPPLEMENT, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
CONFERENcE BOARD, Op. cit. supra p. 4 and of bonuses, same, REPORT ON PROFiT
SHARING (1920) p. 49.
28. See N. Y. Times public notices of plan; June 25, 1930, p. 37, June 26,
1930, p. 31.
29. N. J. STAT. (1925) c. 175, § 1; see supra note 18. According to statute,
the plan is to be for "any or all" of the employees. It may require re-phrasing.
30. Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 60 F. (2d) 14 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
The opinion may be entirely dicta, for the district court's decree dismissed the
case as involving internal affairs of a foreign corporation. 60 F. (2d) 106
(S. D. N. Y. 1932). The decision above affirmed the decree but the opinion
went on to the merits. See dissent, Judge Swan, at p. 120, 122.
31. The statute (supra note 34) requires that the directors "shall first
formulate such plan or plans and pass a resolution declaring that...
adoption thereof is advisable, and shall call a meeting of stockholders to take
action thereon." Again, redrafting may be necessary.
32. 72 NEw REPUBLIC 343 (Nov. 9, 1932).
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purchase plan,83 and the other a "labor co-partnership" 84 is out of place.
In the first, the court could do no more than enforce the contract between
the parties. In the second, the court could hardly discard the existing
social conventions which support the rights of absentee stockholders to
their share of profits, in order to promote a novel scheme of labor co-
partnership. But there is no reason why excessive compensation to execu-
tives acquired by abusing the mechanism of profit sharing should not be
reduced to reasonable amounts. Such relief provides the minority stock-
holder with his ultimate guaranty against the arbitrary discretion of
directors and majority stockholders.
33. Larkin v. Stewart, supra note 10.
34. Nichols v. Olympia Veneer Co., supra note 11.
